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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
My primary research interest lies in applying micro-economic theory and structural modeling
techniques to the fields of industrial organization and marketing. More specifically, I am interested
in the interaction of product characteristics and consumer heterogeneity, and the role of information
about products and individuals in the decision-making processes of consumers and firms. To this
end, the chapters in this dissertation apply a wide range of techniques to investigate models in which
product characteristics strike different consumers in different ways, analyzing how information is
used or could be used by the consumers and firms in such markets. Chapter 2 employs methods
from the theoretical literature on quality and price signaling to investigate a model wherein a firm
has private information about its product that consumers can incur a cost to learn before making a
purchase decision. Chapter 3 uses a structural model to empirically investigate the importance of
a specific type of consumer information, and Chapter 4 provides a Bayesian technique for inves-
tigating household-level heterogeneity in purchase decisions. This dissertation investigates related
questions from very different angles, demonstrating some of the vast array of tools at the disposal of
economists and marketers, and applying these methods to advance knowledge about the interaction
of product characteristics, consumer heterogeneity, and information.
The second chapter of the dissertation seeks to analyze the role of price signaling and con-
sumer audit in a model where consumers have heterogeneous tastes over a monopolist’s product.
In this model, consumers are not only heterogeneous in their base taste levels for the product itself,
they are also heterogeneous in the way that the product’s single characteristic affects their utility;
some consumers desire a higher level of the characteristic, while others desire a lower level of the
characteristic. One example of such a characteristic could be the proportion of foreign-produced
inputs of a product, wherein some consumers prefer domestically-produced inputs while others do
not. Another example could be the fat content of a product, for which some consumers prefer the
improved taste of a high fat content while others prefer low-fat, healthier products. Such differ-
ences in a product’s characteristics may also lead to substantial differences in production costs, a
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consideration which is included in the construction of the model. In short, this chapter develops
an asymmetric information model of a monopolistic firm wherein consumers have heterogeneous
preferences over the firm’s product. The firm has ability to signal via price, but also faces the possi-
bility of consumers choosing to incur an audit cost to acquire this information before purchase. As
a result, the firm must choose whether to signal via price or to leave the decision (and burden) of
becoming informed to the consumer. This model is valuable to the field of industrial organization
since a novel product, about which consumers have limited information, will often have attributes
that strike different consumers in very different ways. Given the vast amount of available product
information via published product specifications, online product reviews, and other sources, these
consumers also face a choice of whether or not to incur a cost (monetary or in effort) to become fully
informed about a product before they make a purchasing decision. Therefore, firms must account for
both consumer heterogeneity and information acquisition when choosing price, and understanding
this dynamic is important for both economists and policymakers.
The resulting equilibria of the model are analyzed with and without the possibility of con-
sumer verification. As a result of the structure of the model, expected aggregate demand will either
be increasing or decreasing in the level of the characteristic, depending on the relative proportion
of consumer types and the weight that the respective types put upon the level of the characteris-
tic. Therefore, expected aggregate demand can be used to determine which of the firm’s types is
“strong” and which type is “weak.” When expected aggregate demand is increasing in the level
of the characteristic, the high type is strong (preferred on average), and when expected aggregate
demand is decreasing in the level of the characteristic, the low type is strong. In the case where
consumer verification is not possible, it is found that there exists a unique Perfect Bayesian equilib-
rium satisfying the Intuitive Criterion of Cho and Kreps (1987) in which the level of the product’s
characteristic is revealed through price signaling. When the low type is strong, the level of the
characteristic is signaled with an upward-distortion in the low-type’s equilibrium price, and when
the high type is strong, the level of the characteristic is signaled with a downward-distortion in the
high-type’s equilibrium price.
When the possibility of consumer verification is added to the model, so that after learning the
product’s price a consumer can choose to incur an audit cost in order to learn the value of the prod-
uct’s characteristic, there exist conditions on the parameters of the model such that there will exist a
2
second equilibrium in addition to the aforementioned separating equilibrium. In this second equilib-
rium type, the monopolistic firm charges the same price regardless of the level of the characteristic,
and all consumers choose to verify the level of the characteristic. That is, the firm does not reveal
the level of the characteristic through signaling, but shifts the burden of becoming informed onto
consumers.
As it is possible for two equilibria to survive refinement in the case when consumers are able to
audit, I conduct a welfare analysis of the two equilibria, and show that either equilibrium may be
more efficient, depending on the values of the parameters. I concluded that in order to maximize
social welfare any efforts by a policymaker to make product information more accessible to con-
sumers should be selective in the products they target, as lowering the cost of consumer audit can
actually result in a less efficient equilibrium in some cases.
Chapter 3 is a paper co-authored by P.J. Glandon, wherein we analyze the value of information
regarding how much a consumer cares about their health (consumer health conscientiousness) in
the estimation of demand for products wherein a brand’s “healthiness” may be of concern. As
disentangling the effects heterogeneity in healthy vs unhealthy eating habits could be valuable in
determining a firm’s optimal strategy across markets in which consumer preferences over “healthy”
vs “unhealthy” products differ, this investigation is important to both economists and marketers.
Given the active policy debate over nutrition and health, the results of our analysis are also valuable
to policymakers.
As a consumer’s determination of a product’s “healthiness” is a matter of perception, which
could be argued to be a function of any number of observable and unobservable product characteris-
tics together with the consumer’s level of health conscientiousness, one could attempt to perform an
analysis that controls for heterogeneity in the perception of a product’s “healthiness.” However, as
our goal is to analyze the value of information regarding consumer health conscientiousness in the
estimation of demand, such an analysis is unnecessary (and would almost necessarily be confined to
an experimental setting). Therefore, this chapter investigates the significance of the coefficients on
the interactions of a variable measuring health conscientiousness with observable product character-
istics in the determination of demand across a category wherein a brand’s “healthiness” is important
to some consumers.
The ideal dataset for our study would be a panel of individual (household) purchases, complete
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with demographic information including a variable serving as a measure of health conscientious-
ness. However, to our knowledge no such panel currently exists. Therefore, we apply the discrete
choice model presented in Nevo (2001) to a simulated population of households by combining data
from both the Current Population Survey (henceforth CPS) and the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveil-
lance System (henceforth BRFSS) in order to associate each household with a dummy variable
for smoking. Given the well known and very serious health implications of smoking, the result is
a simulated panel of households for each city that includes a proxy variable for consumer health
conscientiousness. This dataset is then used to investigate whether or not the coefficients on the
interaction of the smoking dummy and health-related product characteristics are statistically signif-
icant in the estimation of demand in the ready-to-eat cereal category. A category chosen for the
substantial variation in the characteristics associated with healthy eating, such as sugar, fat, and
fiber content, and for the clear presence of the targeting of health conscious consumers with specific
brands.
The estimation proceeds by using the aforementioned simulated population of households to
predict the shares of each cereal in a given city, conditional on the value of the model parameters
including the values of the coefficients on the interaction of the smoking dummy variable and the
amount of sugar, fat, and fiber in each cereal. Estimation is completed by finding the vector of
parameters that minimizes the distance between the observed shares and the resulting simulated
shares. Our results suggest that the interaction of the smoking behavior and the sugar content of a
cereal may be important in the estimation of demand within the ready-to-eat cereal category, and
may therefore be a worthwhile addition to the commonly collected demographic information in
household panel datasets.
Chapter 4, the final chapter of this dissertation, presents a marketing model for handling a
commonly overlooked problem in the estimation of household-level preferences: within-household
heterogeneity. A significant challenge in marketing analysis is to construct models that handle con-
sumer heterogeneity in such a way as to draw inference about “average” consumer preferences while
still allowing for the recovery of actionable information about how these preferences differ across
the consumer base. This goal is complicated when the “individual” in a dataset is a household, a
fairly common situation given the prevalence of household-level panel datasets in marketing anal-
ysis. It is widely accepted that the decisions of a household are affected by the interactions of the
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individuals within the household, and that a single set of preferences is insufficient to control for the
amalgamation of the several sets of preferences that could underly observed purchasing behavior.
Though there are many methods for handling heterogeneity across households, there are few models
designed to handle heterogeneity within households. As a result, most models in the extant literature
on the estimation of consumer preferences either treat the household as having a single set of pref-
erences, or ignore the household structure altogether and assume that individuals act independently.
These approaches are somewhat defensible in much of the econometrics literature, as the param-
eters describing individual consumer preferences are typically considered nuisance parameters in
the estimation of the aggregate-level parameters used in market analysis and/or policy; however,
given the aforementioned goals, such models are inadequate for the purposes of marketing. The
few marketing models that do attempt to include within-household heterogeneity are limited in the
datasets to which the model can be applied and/or yield little to no actionable information about
how households differ in their preferences over products and product characteristics.
By comparison, the model presented in chapter 4 uses Bayesian techniques to fit a finite mixture
model. In a typical finite mixture model, the preferences of an individual household are assumed
to be described by one of finitely many “mixing distributions” or segments. I adapt the method of
Allenby, Arora, and Ginter (1998) to allow each purchase of a household to be the result of a mix-
ture of such segments, using the assumption that the choices of demographically similar households
will tend to have similar probabilities of belonging to a given segment. This allows my model to
handle within-household heterogeneity as well as the multiple discreteness/variety seeking present
in complex markets such as ready-to-eat cereal and soft drinks. Moreover, within-household hetero-
geneity is modeled in such a way as to estimate the distribution of preferences within each segment
while providing useful information about the how the choices of specific household demographic
types are distributed across the segments. As a result, the model provides both aggregate level in-
formation about preferences and the more granular information about individual households that is
valuable in modern marketing. My model accomplishes this while being both logically and com-
putationally suitable for larger household panel datasets, and therefore has substantial value in the
field of marketing.
To demonstrate the ability of the model to retrieve the underlying parameters of the components
of household preferences, the model is applied to two simulated household-level panel datasets.
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The simulated purchases of each household in these datasets arise from a mixture of multiple sets
of preferences, as described above, wherein the true values of the parameters of these preferences
are known. The results of these simulations are presented, and in both cases the posterior draws of
the model do well in navigating to the true underlying parameters used to generate the data. The
chapter is then concluded by discussing how a practitioner could apply the model, and the common
methods for handling potential challenges in the estimation process.
Taken as a whole, this dissertation presents a clear in-depth analysis of the interaction of product
characteristics, consumer heterogeneity, and information. Three important questions/problems in
industrial organization and marketing, related via my stated research interests, are analyzed using
three different techniques. The results of each chapter contribute to the corresponding literature,
and demonstrate the value in being able to approach a problem using a wide array of techniques.
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CHAPTER II
QUALITY SIGNALING WITH COSTLY VERIFICATION BY HETEROGENEOUS
CONSUMERS
II.1 Introduction
The goal of this paper is to analyze the role of price signaling and consumer verification in a
model where consumers have heterogeneous tastes over a monopolist’s product; that is, to investi-
gate the signaling behavior of a monopolist when information about the product is available to the
consumer at a cost (an audit cost). Such a model is interesting as consumers naturally differ in the
way they perceive a specific characteristic of a good, thereby affecting each consumer’s incentive
to become informed, as well as the firm’s incentive to signal the value of this characteristic. For
example, consider a good that is produced using both foreign and domestic inputs (parts and labor).
One consumer may consider a high proportion of foreign inputs to be a negative characteristic,1
while another consumer may have no preference whatsoever, or may even prefer a high proportion
of foreign inputs. Another example is the recycled content of a product, about which some con-
sumers care greatly while others are indifferent. Even the fat content of a food product serves as an
example, as some consumers may enjoy the additional flavor provided by a high-fat content, while
other consumers would prefer a low-fat content despite a decrease in flavor. If the value of the char-
acteristic in question (proportion of foreign inputs, recycled content, fat content) is the firm’s private
information, it is plausible that a consumer would not have to rely on the actions of the firm to be-
come informed. To illustrate this, consider the example of a new product with foreign and domestic
inputs. If this is a novel product, it is reasonable to assume that there are no close substitutes and
that consumers will not know the proportion of the product’s inputs that are foreign. While the firm
may signal this information to the consumer via price, a consumer who cares about the proportion
of foreign inputs may be able to access this information via the internet (or elsewhere) by incurring
1Effects of the consumer’s purchase on his or her own income are assumed to be negligible; that is, the consumer’s
reasons for preferring domestically produced goods are not based on monetary benefits received due to the purchase. In
this particular example, the consumer may just have a “made in the USA” preference.
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some cost of effort. Therefore, the model is one of asymmetric information in that the level of
the characteristic in question is the private information of the monopolistic firm that produces the
product; however, this information may be available to consumers that are willing to incur an audit
cost.
As consumers in this model are assumed to respond differently to the product characteristic in
question, some consumers’ demand curves will be increasing in the level of this characteristic, while
the demand curves of others may be constant or even decreasing in the level of the characteristic.
If, however, consumers’ demand curves are aggregated, the resulting aggregate demand curve will
be either increasing or decreasing in the level of the characteristic, and aggregate demand can then
be used to vertically differentiate products that differ only in the value of this characteristic. To
illustrate this using a more classic language as a convention, assume that X denotes the value of the
characteristic in question. If aggregate demand is increasing in X , then the firm is “stronger” when
it produces a product with a greater X , and if aggregate demand is decreasing in X , then the firm is
“weaker” when it produces a product with a greater X . One could use a similar convention in com-
paring the model to the existing quality literature: a greater X results in a “higher-quality” product
when the aggregate demand is increasing in X , and a greater X results in a “lower-quality” product
when the aggregate demand curve is decreasing in X . Therefore “quality” could be increasing or
decreasing in the level of the product’s characteristic, depending on the preferences of different con-
sumer types and the relative proportion of these consumer types within the population (consumer
demographics). Consider again the example of a product with some proportion of foreign inputs.
Naturally, as the proportion of these inputs increases, the production cost (in most cases) would be
expected to decrease. Similarly, the production cost in this model is assumed to be decreasing in
the level of the characteristic;2 however, the aforementioned notion of quality in this model allows
a higher-quality product to be more expensive or less expensive to produce than a lower-quality
product, depending on consumer demographics. The model assumes that while the firm is unable
to identify the preferences of individual consumers, the firm does know the relevant demographics
of the consumer base.
In short, the paper develops a model of a monopolistic firm with private information about a
2While production costs are assumed to be decreasing in the level of the characteristic for convenience, the model can
be reformulated with production costs that are increasing in the characteristic with similar results.
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characteristic of its product (over which anonymous consumers have heterogeneous preferences)
that has ability to signal via price and faces the possibility of consumers choosing to incur an audit
cost to acquire this information before purchase. In addition, the firm will face production costs that
are decreasing in the level of the product’s characteristic. As a result of the structure, the firm must
choose whether to signal via price, or to leave the decision (and burden) of becoming informed to
the consumer.
The resulting equilibria of the model are analyzed with and without the possibility of consumer
verification. When consumer verification is not possible, it is found that there exists a unique Perfect
Bayesian equilibrium satisfying the Intuitive Criterion Cho and Kreps (1987) in which the level of
the product’s characteristic is revealed through price signaling. As previously discussed, production
cost is decreasing in the value of the characteristic, and a higher value of the characteristic may result
in a higher-quality or lower-quality product depending upon consumer demographics. When lower
levels of the characteristic (and thus higher production costs) result in a higher-quality product, the
value of the characteristic is signaled with an upward-distortion in price. When higher levels of the
characteristic (and thus lower production costs) result in a higher-quality product, the value of the
characteristic is signaled with an downward-distortion in price.
When the possibility of consumer verification is added to the model, so that after learning the
product’s price a consumer can choose to incur an audit cost in order to learn the value of the prod-
uct’s characteristic, there exist conditions on the parameters of the model such that there will exist a
second equilibrium (in addition to the separating equilibrium above) wherein the monopolistic firm
charges the same price regardless of the value of the characteristic, and all consumers choose to
verify the value of the characteristic. That is, the firm does not reveal the value of the characteristic
through signaling, but shifts the burden of becoming informed onto consumers. Welfare analysis of
the two equilibria show that either equilibrium may be more efficient, depending on the values of the
parameters. It is concluded that in order to maximize social welfare, any efforts by a social planner
to make product information more accessible to consumers should be selective in the products they
target, as lowering the cost of consumer audit can actually result in a less efficient equilibrium in
some cases.
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II.1.1 Outline
Section 2 of this paper constructs a full information model of a monopolistic firm and heteroge-
neous consumers as described above. Section 3 analyzes the model under asymmetric information
where price signaling can occur, and Section 4 adds the possibility of consumer audit to the model
with asymmetric information. Section 5 discusses policy implications of the model, and Section 6
concludes the paper.
II.1.2 Related Literature
There is a substantial literature devoted to analyzing the ability of a firm to signal quality via
price.3 Bagwell and Riordan (1991) construct a two-type model in which production costs are
greater for the higher quality type, and find that the higher quality type will distort price upward
in order to separate in equilibrium. The model presented here is similar as there are two types for
the firm, however, these types are not differentiated by quality, but rather by the level of a specific
characteristic of the product. Additionally, there are two types of consumer in the model of this
paper, and the varying preferences and proportions of each consumer type are what determines the
firm type that is viewed as the “high-quality” or “strong” type. Furthermore, though production
costs in the model presented here are decreasing in the level of the product’s characteristic, these
costs may be greater or less for the high-quality type (as previously discussed). Since it is the high-
quality firm type that chooses to distort its price to separate, the price distortion by this type may be
upward or downward, depending upon consumer demographics.
A more similar model (in terms of production cost/quality relationship and the direction of the
equilibrium price distortion) is that of Daughety and Reinganum (1995), wherein a monopolistic
firm that is one of a continuum of types faces full unit costs that are the sum of pure production
costs and liability costs. Though the cost of production is assumed to be increasing in quality4
similar to Bagwell and Riordan’s model, the liability costs depend on the quality of the product,
3In addition to the papers discussed here, see Bagwell (1992), Daughety and Reinganum (1997, 2005), and Ellingsen
(1997) for monopoly models of price signaling; see Daughety and Reinganum (2007, 2008b), and Jansen and Roy (2010)
for oligopoly models of price signaling.
4Daughety and Reinganum interpret quality as safety, with the measure of safety being the probability of product
failure that may or may not injure the consumer.
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as well as the liability system, therefore allowing the full unit cost to be increasing or decreasing
in quality depending on the firm’s expected liability for injuries caused by its product. Daughety
and Reinganum find that a higher quality firm distorts price in order to separate, and that the dis-
tortion is upward when the full unit cost is increasing in quality and downward when full unit cost
is decreasing in quality. While these results are similar to those found in the analogous cases of
this paper (those without consumer audit), there are significant differences in the models that will
be discussed shortly. The model that is closest in structure to that presented here is Daughety and
Reinganum (2008a), wherein a monopolistic firm that is one of two types, with a cost structure
similar to Daughety and Reinganum (1995), may signal its type via price or may incur some cost to
credibly disclose its type to consumers. The model presented here is similar to Daughety and Rein-
ganum (1995 and 2008a) in the quality/production cost structure and in using quadratic consumer
utility; however, there are important differences. Daughety and Reinganum do not allow for con-
sumers to be heterogeneous in how they view quality, and in addition, Daughety and Reinganum’s
model does not consider the possibility of consumers paying an audit cost to become fully informed
about the product.
A recent subset of the literature analyzes the interaction between price signaling and direct
disclosure to the consumer, assuming the firm has the ability to do either (or both).5 For example,
Fishman and Hagerty (2003) and Daughety and Reinganum (2008b) construct models in which
a firm can use signaling or disclosure (or both) to inform consumers about product quality. The
possibility of disclosure is analyzed in the model presented here; however, in the interest of brevity
these results are reported very simply at the end of Section 3 in order to maintain the focus on
consumer audit.
Other recent papers, such as Bar-Isaac, Caruana, and Cun˜at (2011, 2010) construct models
with the possibility of consumer audit, but like the aforementioned signaling models, there are
important differences between these recent audit models and the model presented here. In Bar-
Isaac, Caruana, and Cun˜at (2011), the authors analyze a model in which a monopolist sells a product
with two characteristics at an exogenously determined price; one of these characteristics is fixed at
5For early models of costless disclosure and subsequent “unraveling,” see Grossman (1981) and Milgrom (1981).
For an early model of costly disclosure see Jovanovic (1982). Though there is a substantial literature on disclosure of
information, the main focus of this model is price signaling and thus a thorough review of this literature is omitted for
brevity. For a recent review of both the theoretical and empirical literature on disclosure see Dranove and Jin (2010).
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high quality, while the other has quality that is stochastically affected by the firm’s chosen level of
investment in quality. Though consumers in Bar-Isaac et al. (2011) are heterogeneous in which of
the two characteristics they view as being more important, all consumers agree on what constitutes
high quality, and are able to incur a cost (if they so choose) to evaluate the quality of one of the
two characteristics. In Bar-Isaac, Caruana, and Cun˜at (2010), the authors analyze a model in which
the value of a monopolist’s product to individual consumers is stochastically affected by her level
investment in the product; this investment increases the probability of a “good” match over a “bad”
match for each consumer. Consumers are also heterogeneous in their base taste for the product,
and can incur a cost (if they so choose) to evaluate whether the product is good or bad match for
them individually. The firm chooses the aforementioned investment, the price of the product, and
a “marketing strategy” that determines the cost to the consumer of evaluating the product’s quality.
Though the model of this paper has a similar structure to the above papers in that a monopolist is
selling a product for which she has asymmetric information, and consumers can incur a cost to learn
that information, there are important differences. First, consumers in the model presented here are
not only heterogeneous in their base taste for the product, consumers also have opposing views on
what represents high quality (some prefer a high level of the characteristic, while others prefer a
low value of the characteristic). This is clearly different from Bar-Isaac et al. (2011), but is also
fundamentally different from Bar-Isaac et al. (2010). To see this, note that while the product in
Bar-Isaac et al. (2010) may be a “bad” match for some consumers and a “good” match for others, it
is also the case that an increase in the level of investment makes the product more likely to be a good
match for all consumers. In the model of this paper, the characteristic in question affects consumer
types in opposing ways, thus any change in the characteristic makes the product less attractive to
one type of consumer (the product cannot be a “good match” for both consumer types). Another
important difference is that the production costs in both Bar-Isaac et al. (2010) and Bar-Isaac et al.
(2011) are assumed to be the same across firm types, while production costs in the model of this
paper are decreasing in the value of the characteristic. Most importantly, neither paper by Bar-Isaac,
Caruana, and Cun˜at consider price signaling as a means for the firm to convey its type to consumers.
To my knowledge, there is only one other model, Bester and Ritzberger (2001), that combines
price signaling with the possibility of consumer audit. In this paper Bester and Ritzberger analyze a
market in which a monopolist sells a product that is either high or low quality. Bester and Ritzberger
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assume that consumers are homogeneous in their preferences for the good (that is, all consumers
agree on the type that represents higher quality), but are heterogeneous in their outside options. The
differences in consumers’ outside options yields downward-sloping demand for the monopolist’s
product, depending upon consumers’ beliefs about the product’s quality. Bester and Ritzberger
also assume that production costs are the same for both the high- and low-quality product, and as
production costs are assumed to be type-independent, the firm’s profits depend solely on consumer
beliefs about quality and not directly on the firm’s type. Therefore, in the base model without
consumer verification the usual equilibria exist (separating, pure-pooling, partial-pooling), but the
Intuitive Criterion does not refine the set of equilibria (as any price deviation is equally attractive to
both of the firm’s types). These same features hold in the model with consumer verification, and so
Bester and Ritzberger propose a “modified” version of the Intuitive Criterion that eliminates the pure
pooling equilibrium (wherein both firm types charge the same price and some fraction of consumers
engage in audit), and depending on the cost of consumer verification, sometimes eliminates the
separating equilibrium. The result is that for a sufficiently small cost of consumer verification, the
refinement selects an equilibrium that involves partial pooling in prices and a fraction of consumers
choosing to engage in audit.
By contrast, my base model is more similar to the standard models of price signaling discussed
earlier in this literature review, wherein production costs differ across firm types, firm profits de-
pend directly on the firm’s type as well as on consumer beliefs, and wherein refinement by the
Intuitive Criterion selects a (unique) separating equilibrium. The model presented here also dif-
fers from that of Bester and Ritzberger in that consumer heterogeneity results from disagreement
about which product type is preferable; some consumers prefer one type, while other consumers
prefer the other type. The possibility of consumer audit is then added to the base model, and it is
shown that a separating equilibrium (analogous to that of the base model) survives refinement by
the Intuitive Criterion; however, a new equilibrium also survives refinement, wherein both of the
firm’s types charge the same price and consumers engage in audit to verify the firm’s type. Though
this second “single-price” equilibrium6 survives refinement by the Intuitive Criterion, all hybrid
(partial-pooling) equilibria are eliminated via refinement by the Intuitive Criterion. As there are
6 The term “single-price” equilibrium is used over the typical “pooling” equilibrium terminology for reasons discussed
in Section 4.
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cases in which both the single-price equilibrium and the separating equilibrium exist (after refine-
ment), the welfare properties of these two equilibria are compared and the results used to assess the
social benefit of decreasing the cost of consumer audit.
II.2 The Model
II.2.1 The Firm
Consider a monopolistic risk-neutral firm which has developed a new product. The firm is
assumed to be one of two types, denoted by τ ∈ {H,L} (high or low). These types differ only in the
value of a specific characteristic of the firm’s product, denoted by Xτ ∈ {XH ,XL}. For simplicity,
the value of XL is assumed to be zero, with XH > 0. The marginal cost of production for the firm’s
high type is assumed to be zero, while the marginal cost of production for the low type is c > 0;
a simple and intuitive application of such a structure is the aforementioned example of a product
with some proportion of foreign produced inputs. If this proportion is the characteristic in question,
it is reasonable to assume (in most cases) that a firm must pay more to produce a product with a
lower proportion of foreign inputs. It is assumed that nature determines the firm’s type,7 with the
probability of the firm being the high type denoted by λ (λ = Pr(τ = H)) where λ ∈ (0,1). The
firm sets a price to maximize profits, and produces to fill demand.
II.2.2 Consumers
All consumers are risk-neutral and may purchase multiple units of the good. Consumers have
heterogeneous preferences in two ways. First, each consumer has some level of “taste” for the
product, given by θ . The value of θ is uniformly distributed over [θ ,θ +1], and thus θ represents
the minimum value for a consumer’s taste. This continuum of consumers is assumed to have a mass
equal to one. In addition to this, consumers are of two types in the way they perceive the level of
X . Some consumers are “X-seekers” (type S) while others are “X-avoiders” (type A). A consumer’s
7Though the probability of each type is assumed to be exogenous for simplicity, the model could be extended to
include a preliminary stage in which the firm engages in some activity to affect the probability of each type, as in
Daughety and Reinganum (1995).
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type, denoted by T ∈ {S,A}, is determined by nature and is independent of the consumer’s taste.
The probability of a consumer being type A is given by α (α = Pr(T = A)) where α ∈ (0,1). Each
consumer is therefore characterized by the pair (θ ,T ), and this pair is assumed to be the consumer’s
private information. The consumer’s type determines how the level of Xτ affects his or her utility.
That is, a greater Xτ decreases the utility of X-avoider consumers by some amount, but increases
(or has no effect on) the utility of X-seeker consumers. To model this, the scalar γT is used to
convert units of X into positive (or negative) utils, with γS ≥ 0, and γA < 0. The structure can again
be demonstrated using the example of a product with some proportion of foreign inputs. While
all consumers have different levels of taste for the product, θ , they also differ in the effect that
the proportion of foreign inputs has on their utility. Some consumers (X-seekers) may not care
about where the content of the product is produced (γS = 0), or may prefer the product’s content be
produced elsewhere (γS > 0), while others (X-avoiders) dislike products with a higher proportion
of foreign inputs (γA < 0) and will therefore, ceteris paribus, purchase less of a product if the
proportion of foreign inputs is larger.
All of the above characteristics can now be captured by the following utility function of a type
T consumer with a taste for the good given by θ , purchasing q units of a type τ product at price p:
U(q, p,τ,θ ,T ) = (θ + γT Xτ)q− .5q2− pq. (II.1)
Note what equation (II.1) implies about the effects of the level of X on consumer utility.8 A product
with Xτ = XL will result in both types of consumers receiving similar utility for the same quantity
since XL = 0. If, however, Xτ =XH , then X-seekers may have much higher utility than X-avoiders for
consuming the same quantity of the product. Naturally, this will induce X-seekers and X-avoiders
to demand different quantities of the same product (in general).
In order to simplify the analysis it is assumed that every consumer (except possibly those on
the margin with the lowest possible level of taste, θ ) will choose to purchase a positive amount of
the firm’s product at equilibrium prices. Under full information, this is achieved by the following
assumption:
8This representation of utility is the reduced form of a quasilinear consumer utility function where a composite of all
other goods is the numeraire and the price of the numeraire is normalized to be 1. Income is omitted from the equation
for notational convenience, as it has no effect on the results.
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A.1 θ ≥max[.5−2γAXH +(αγA+(1−α)γS)XH , .5+ c].
The consumer is assumed to be fully informed in this section of the paper. As a result, the
consumer bases the purchasing decision directly on the firm’s type. Maximizing equation (II.1)
over q yields the following first order condition:
(θ + γT Xτ)−q− p = 0.
Therefore, given the firm type τ and price p, the demand of a type T consumer with taste level θ
will be:9
q(p,τ,θ ,T ) = θ + γT Xτ − p.
Since α is the probability of a consumer being type A, and α is independent of the consumer’s taste,
the expected demand of a consumer with taste θ is:
q(p,τ,θ , ·)≡ α(θ + γAXτ − p)+(1−α)(θ + γSXτ − p)
= θ +(αγA+(1−α)γS)Xτ − p.
Note the constant (αγA + (1−α)γS) in this equation (as well as in assumption A.1). This is a
weighted average of the γ’s that converts Xτ into utils, and in essence reflects the average consumer’s
preference over the characteristic X . If this value is positive, the proportion of X-seekers and X-
avoiders, weighted by the corresponding γ’s, yields higher expected demand for products with a
higher level of X . For notational simplicity, henceforth we will use ω to represent this value, that is:
ω = (αγA+(1−α)γS).
Finally, by integrating over all possible taste levels, and thus aggregating over all possible tastes, the
9 Though demand is actually given by q(p,τ,θ ,T ) = max[θ + γT Xτ − p,0], the maximization is omitted given as-
sumption A.1.
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aggregate expected demand for a type τ product at price p is given by:
Q(p,τ)≡
∫ θ+1
θ
(θ +ωXτ − p)dθ
= .5+θ +ωXτ − p.
The model uses a single-period market, where interaction occurs over three stages: Nature
chooses the firm’s type and each consumer’s type, the firm observes its type and sets a price p, and
each consumer then decides the quantity of the product he or she will purchase. As noted above,
the firm produces to meet demand, and profits are realized at the end of the last stage.
II.2.3 Full-Information Equilibria
Given the expected demand for each of the firm’s types, the full-information expected profit
functions are defined as follows:
Π(p,H) = pQ(p,H) = p(.5+θ +ωXH − p).
Π(p,L) = (p− c)Q(p,L) = (p− c)(.5+θ − p).
Maximizing these expressions yields the following full information prices:
P f ullH =
.5+θ +ωXH
2
,
P f ullL =
.5+θ + c
2
.
Full-information expected profits are then given by:
Π(p f ullH ,H) =Π
f ull
H =
[
.5+θ +ωXH
2
]2
,
Π(p f ullL ,L) =Π
f ull
L =
[
.5+θ − c
2
]2
.
Recall that c denotes the production cost for the low-type firm, and thatωXH denotes the average
increase (or decrease) in consumer utility due to a high level of X . As these quantities capture the
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Figure II.1: Comparison of low-type and high-type profit curves
effects of the differences between the firm types, the ordinal relationship between c and ωXH will
determine which firm type will have the greater full-information profits and full-information price;
there are three possibilities, illustrated by Figure 1. First, when ωXH > c, the full information
price will be higher for the firm’s high type (p f ullH > p
f ull
L ), and profits for the firm’s high type will
also be higher (Π f ullH > Π
f ull
L ). The top left diagram illustrates this case. The second possibility is
that −c < ωXH < c, in which case (p f ullH < p f ullL ) and (Π f ullH > Π f ullL ), illustrated by the top right
diagram. Finally, if ωXH < −c, then (p f ullH < p f ullL ) and (Π f ullH < Π f ullL ), illustrated in the lower
diagram above. Note that it is impossible for (p f ullH > p
f ull
L ) and (Π
f ull
H <Π
f ull
L ).
II.3 Asymmetric Information
Assume that the game (the payoffs, extensive form, and priors) is common knowledge, but the
firm’s type (τ) and each consumer’s taste/type pair (θ ,T ) is private information. Also assume that
the firm cannot credibly disclose its type. Therefore, the only information available to the consumer
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about the firm’s type is that which can be inferred from the product’s price.
As a result, consumers will base their purchasing decisions on their beliefs about the product’s
type given the product’s price, b(p), where b represents the consumer’s perceived probability that
the firm is the high type (b(p) ≡ Pr{τ = H|p}), and firms will rely on the aggregate demographic
information about consumers given by α . Note that b will sometimes be used in place of b(p) for
notational convenience, and is intended to denote b(p) unless stated otherwise.
Given that price signaling by the firm can result in upward (or downward) distortions in price,
the following adjustment is made to assumption A.1 for cases when ω < 0 in order to guarantee that
every consumer (except possibly those with the lowest possible taste level) will choose to purchase
a positive amount of the product at equilibrium prices.
A.1′ θ ≥

max[.5−2γAXH +ωXH , .5+ c, .5+ z1] if ω < 0,
max[.5−2γAXH +ωXH , .5+ c] if ω ≥ 0,
where z1≡
√
−2ωXH(.5+θ)− (ωXH)2. Note that z1 is real whenω < 0 by the original assumption
A.1 (It will be shown in the following analysis that z1 characterizes the upward distortion of the
firm’s low type when it is optimal for the low type to distort its price to separate).
II.3.1 Demand and Firm Profits
Given consumer beliefs, b(p), together with the two possible firm types H and L, the expected
utility of a type T consumer with taste for the good given by θ , purchasing q units of uncertain
product type at price p will be:10
E[U(q, p,τ,θ ,T )|b(p)] = b(p)[(θ + γT XH)q− .5q2− pq]+
(1−b(p))[(θ + γT XL)q− .5q2− pq]
= (θ + γT b(p)XH)q− .5q2− pq.
Where the latter expression employs the normalization that XL = 0. Maximizing this expected utility
10 Note that income has again been omitted from the expression for convenience.
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over q yields the following first order condition:
(θ + γT b(p)XH)−q− p = 0.
Note that the firm’s true type is not found in the above expression, as consumers base their purchas-
ing decision on their beliefs about the firm’s type given the product’s price. As a result, the notation
for quantity in the asymmetric-information case will be changed from that of the full-information
case by replacing the argument τ (the firm’s type) with b(p) (consumer beliefs about the firm’s
type). Therefore, given beliefs b(p) and price p, the demand of a type T consumer with taste level
θ will be:
q(p,b(p),θ ,T ) = (θ + γT b(p)XH − p).
By taking the expectation of demand over consumer types and integrating (aggregating) this over
all possible consumer taste levels, the aggregate expected demand for a product of price p under
consumer beliefs b(p) is given by:
Q(p,b(p))≡
∫ θ+1
θ
(α(θ + γAb(p)XH − p)+(1−α)(θ + γSb(p)XH − p))dθ
= .5+θ +ωb(p)XH − p.
(II.2)
Note that for an arbitrary value of b, ∂q/∂b=ωXH , that is, the effect of beliefs on aggregate demand
will hinge on the sign of ω .
Unlike quantity and aggregate quantity derived above, the profits for each firm type will depend
on both consumer beliefs (b(p)) and the firm’s type (τ). Therefore, the notation for the profit
functions in the asymmetric-information case will be changed from that of the full-information case
by adding beliefs as an argument. As a result, the profit functions in the asymmetric-information
case are defined as follows:
Π(p,H,b(p))≡ pQ(p,b(p)) = p(.5+θ +ωb(p)XH − p).
Π(p,L,b(p))≡ (p− c)Q(p,b(p)) = (p− c)(.5+θ +ωb(p)XH − p).
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II.3.2 Separating Equilibria
To begin, consider the following characterization of a separating equilibrium in the context of
this model.
Defn. A price pair (psepH , p
sep
L ), together with consumer beliefs b(p), constitutes a separating equi-
librium if psepH 6= psepL and the following incentive compatibility constraints are met:
Π(psepH ,H,1)≥maxp≥0 Π(p,H,b(p)) (II.3)
Π(psepL ,L,0)≥maxp≥c Π(p,L,b(p)) (II.4)
b(psepH ) = 1 (II.5)
b(psepL ) = 0. (II.6)
That is, each of the firm’s types must choose its price to maximize profits given beliefs, and beliefs
must be correct at the equilibrium prices. It will be useful to define the following type- and belief-
specific profits, as these functions provide bounds for the true profit functions that use arbitrary
consumer beliefs:
Π(p,H,1) = p(.5+θ +ωXH − p) (II.7)
Π(p,H,0) = p(.5+θ − p) (II.8)
Π(p,L,0) = (p− c)(.5+θ − p) (II.9)
Π(p,L,1) = (p− c)(.5+θ +ωXH − p). (II.10)
Function (II.7) above is simply the “full information” profit function for the high type; that is, the
profit function for the firm when consumers correctly identify it as the high type. This will be
called the high type’s full information profit function. Function (II.8) above will be called the high
type’s “mimicking profit function;” that is, this function provides the profits for the high type firm,
at price p, when the firm is incorrectly believed to be the low type. Similarly, function (II.9) is
the low type’s full-information profit function, while function (II.10) is the low type’s mimicking
profit function. Figure 2 shows the full-information and mimicking profit curves for both types for
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Figure II.2: Profit functions with −c< ωXH < c
a particular parameter vector wherein −c< ωXH < c.
The following lemma is immediate from the inspection of equation (II.2) and will be useful in
working through the subsequent cases.
Lemma 1. If all other parameter values are held constant, the values of Π(p,H,b) and Π(p,L,b)
are strictly increasing in b if ω > 0, constant in b if ω = 0, and are strictly decreasing in b if ω < 0,
at any given price p. Thus, (i) if ω < 0 the firm’s high type will be tempted to mimic the low type,
while the low type will wish to be identified, (ii) if ω = 0 then beliefs have no effect on profits and
neither of the firm’s types will be tempted to mimic the other, and (iii) if ω > 0, the firm’s low type
will be tempted to mimic the high type, while the high type will wish to be identified.
In other words, the type that will be the high-quality or strong type depends on ω; if ω < 0 then the
low type is strong while if ω > 0 then the high type is strong.
II.3.2.1 Case 1: The Low Type is Strong (ω < 0)
Recall that ω < 0 implies that a higher value of X , on average, has a negative effect on consumer
demand. By Lemma 1, if p′ yields positive profits for the firm’s low type and 0 < b(p′) ≤ 1, then
the low type’s profits will be less than if the low type is identified (b = 0) at p′; that is, Π(p′,L,0)>
Π(p′,L,b(p′)) for all b(p′) ∈ (0,1]. Conversely, if p′ yields positive profits for the firm’s high type
and 0≤ b(p′)< 1, the high type’s profits will be greater than if the high type is identified (b = 1) at
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p′ ; that is, Π(p′,H,1)> Π(p′,H,b(p′)) for all b(p′) ∈ [0,1). As a separating equilibrium requires
b(psepH ) = 1, and p
f ull
H maximizes the strictly concave function Π(p,H,1), Lemma 1 implies that
psepH = p
f ull
H in any such equilibrium, otherwise the high type would have incentive to deviate to
p f ullH regardless of the value of b(p
f ull
H ), yielding the following Lemma.
Lemma 2. If ω < 0, then in any separating equilibrium it must be the case that psepH = p
f ull
H .
An implication of this lemma is that when ω < 0, supporting beliefs for a separating equilibrium
must be constructed in such a way that b(p f ullH ) = 1 andΠ(p
f ull
H ,H,1)≥Π(p,H,b(p)) for all p≥ 0.
What remains to be shown is that there exists a set of beliefs, b(p), and a price for the firm’s low
type, pL, that satisfy this requirement as well as conditions (II.4) and (II.6). Furthermore, these
beliefs must survive refinement by the Intuitive Criterion. The following proposition is proved in
the appendix:
Proposition 1. Let z1 ≡
√
−2ωXH(.5+θ)− (ωXH)2. For ω < 0, the unique (refined) separating
equilibrium is psepH = p
f ull
H , and
i) psepL = p
f ull
L if z1 ≤ c;
ii) psepL = p
f ull
L +
( z1−c
2
)
if z1 > c.
Supporting beliefs for both cases are given by b(p) = 1 when p< psepL and b(p) = 0 otherwise.
Figure 3 illustrates both types of separating equilibria described in Proposition 1. The figure on
the left has parameters such that both firm types are induced to charge the full-information price in
equilibrium (as in Proposition 1, part (i)), while the figure on the right illustrates a case in which
the low type must distort upward from the full-information price in order to prevent mimicry by the
high type (as in Proposition 1, part (ii)). Note that in any case for which the low type must distort
its price, it will be an upward distortion.
II.3.2.2 Case 2: The Trivial Case (ω = 0)
If ω = 0, then the full-information profit function is identical to the mimic profit function for both
types of firm. Therefore, there is no incentive for either firm to mimic and this case reduces to the
full-information case.
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Figure II.3: Separating equilibia when the low type is strong.
Proposition 2. For ω = 0 there exists a unique separating equilibrium in which psepH = p
f ull
H and
psepL = p
f ull
L .
II.3.2.3 Case 3: The High Type is Strong (ω > 0)
Assuming ω > 0, the firm’s high type prefers to be identified, while the firm’s low type is tempted
to mimic the firm’s high type. The following Lemma results from an argument analogous to that
preceding Lemma 2.
Lemma 3. If ω > 0, then in any separating equilibrium it must be the case that psepL = p
f ull
L .
By Lemma 3, any supporting beliefs for a separating equilibrium must be constructed in such a way
that b(p f ullL ) = 0 and Π(p
f ull
L ,L,1)≥Π(p,L,b(p)) for all p≥ 0. What remains is to show that there
exists a set of beliefs, b(p), and a price for the firm’s high type, pH , that satisfy this requirement as
well as conditions (II.3) and (II.5). The proof of the following proposition is analogous to that of
Proposition 1:
Proposition 3. Let z2≡
√
2ω XH(.5+θ − c)+(ωXH)2. For ω > 0, the unique (refined) separating
equilibrium is psepL = p
f ull
L , and
i) psepH = p
f ull
H if z2 ≤ c;
ii) psepH = p
f ull
H −
( z2−c
2
)
if z2 > c.
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Figure II.4: Separating equilibia when the high type is strong.
Supporting beliefs for both cases are given by b(p) = 1 when p≤ psepH and b(p) = 0 otherwise.11
Figure 4 illustrates both types of separating equilibria described in Proposition 3. The figure on
the left has parameters such that both firm types are induced to charge the full-information price in
equilibrium (as in Proposition 3, part (i)), while the figure on the right illustrates a case in which the
high type must distort downward from the full-information price in order to prevent mimicry by the
low type (as in Proposition 3, part (ii)). Note that in any case for which the high type must distort
its price, it will be a downward distortion.
II.3.3 Pooling and Partial-Pooling Equilibria
In a pooling equilibrium each type chooses the same price; that is, ppoolH = p
pool
L . In a partial-
pooling equilibrium at least one of the firm’s types plays a mixed pricing strategy wherein some
(but not all) information about the firm’s type is passed to consumers via equilibrium prices. For
example, one possibility would be the strong type charging price pS in equilibrium, while the weak
type mixes between charging pS and another price pW 6= pS in equilibrium. In this case, consumers
would be certain the firm is the weak type if pW is the observed price, but would be uncertain of
11 Note that while it is possible that p f ullH ≥ p f ullL , these beliefs will still support the separating equilibrium as psepH is
distorted downward below p f ullL whenever p
f ull
H ≥ p f ullL .
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the firm’s type if pS is observed.12 While there are many other ways a partial-pooling equilibrium
could occur, the characteristic of importance to the proposition below is that in any partial-pooling
equilibrium at least one equilibrium price is a pooling price, and thus there is still ambiguity about
the firm’s type at any such price. As is often the case, the Intuitive Criterion eliminates all pooling
equilibria and partial-pooling equilibria in the asymmetric-information model of this section; this is
proved in the appendix.
Proposition 4. There exist no pooling or partial-pooling equilibria satisfying the Intuitive Criterion
in the asymmetric-information case.
II.3.4 Disclosure
As mentioned in the literature review of this paper, there are recent models that combine price
signaling with costly disclosure as two methods by which a firm can communicate its quality to
consumers, for example, Daughety and Reinganum (2008a, 2008c). Although the focus of this
paper is costly consumer audit, the base model of this section can easily be extended to allow
disclosure; however, since the subsequent results are in line with the aforementioned papers, a
rigorous treatment of disclosure is foregone for the sake of brevity. With that said, the basic structure
and results are presented below.
If a firm is allowed to disclose its type directly to consumers at cost k, the advantage of disclosure
is that it allows the firm to charge its full-information price and earn full-information profits. As
some separating equilibria of the model result in full-information prices being charged by both
firms, it is easy to see that neither firm has incentive to incur k to disclose in such cases; the strong
type could not gain more profit through disclosure (and thus would not incur k), and the only way
for the weak type to increase profits would be through mimicry (convincing consumers it is the
strong type) which cannot be facilitated by disclosure (and thus the weak type would not incur k).
In other cases of the model, the strong type must distort its price in order to separate, and in these
cases the strong type will only have incentive to incur k and disclose if the loss in profits due to
distortion (from those of full information) is greater than k. Thus if k is large enough, neither type
12Note that the true probability of a given type conditional on pS being observed would depend upon λ and the mixing
strategy of the weak type.
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has incentive to disclose, but for small enough k the strong type will choose to incur k and charge
its full information price. To see that the weak type will not have incentive to mimic the strong
type in such a case, note that as the strong type has incentive to disclose consumers would interpret
the lack of disclosure as proof that the firm is the weak type, and so the weak type will fail in any
attempt to mimic the strong type; that is, the weak type will have no incentive to deviate from its
full information price.
In summary, for large k the equilibria of the model with disclosure are the same as those sep-
arating equilibria of the model without disclosure; while for small enough k, the strong type will
incur k to disclose and charge its full-information price and the weak type will still charge its full
information price.
II.4 Consumer Audit
In this section, it is assumed that consumers have access to information about the firm’s type;
however, there is a one-time audit cost incurred by the consumer to learn this information, denoted
by a. Additionally, assume that the firm cannot credibly disclose this information directly to the
consumer. As a result, after learning the price of the product, the consumer may choose to pay the
audit cost and access the information before making a purchase, or may choose not to access the
information and use his or her posterior beliefs about the product’s type based only upon its price.
In the aforementioned example of a product with some proportion of foreign inputs, this could be
analogous to product information available on the internet, where the audit cost a is the cost to a
consumer of seeking out, reading, and verifying this information. Other examples of costly sources
of information include consumer publications that require a purchase (e.g. Consumer Reports), and
other information available online in the form of expert reviews, that require some cost of effort.
Even information made available by the firm could be considered in the consumer audit framework
of this section, as a (possibly mandated) disclosure by the firm could be in a format that requires
a significant cost of effort on the part of the consumer in order to understand the disclosure (e.g.,
a booklet containing large amounts of technical product information). Since consumers may still
glean information from the price of the good, price signaling by the firm is still possible. The same
cost structure as in Section 3 is used in this model for simplicity; that is, the cost of production for
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the high type is assumed to be zero while the cost of production for the low type is assumed to be
c> 0.
II.4.1 The Consumer’s Decision
The only change from the model of Section 3 without disclosure is the cost faced by consumers,
a> 0, incurred only if the consumer chooses to verify the product’s type. As this may result in some
consumers incurring a while others do not, this raises the possibility of free-riding. To avoid this,
it is assumed that consumers cannot use the observed purchasing decisions of others to deduce the
firm’s type without incurring a cost that is greater than the audit cost a; that is, it would cost more
(in effort) to deduce firm type by observing others than to simply incur a and verify it directly.
Another important issue is how consumers use beliefs in this model. In addition to being used
in the calculation of the optimal purchasing decision, consumer beliefs are now used in making the
decision as to whether or not to incur the audit cost a. The firm sets the price first, and the consumer
observes this price before making the decision to audit. At any observed price, the consumer will
only choose to incur the audit cost if beliefs indicate a positive probability for both firm types. If
beliefs are 1 or 0 at the observed price, then no consumer will choose to incur a as all consumers are
already “sure” of the firm’s type at that price. This decision is captured by the function δ T (p,b(p)),
where δ T (p,b(p)) = 1 if a type T consumer chooses to audit at price p, and δ T (p,b(p)) = 0
otherwise.13 Now consider the determinants of the consumer’s audit decision. A type T consumer
with taste θ that chooses not to audit will base their purchasing decision upon beliefs, thus the utility
maximizing quantity will be q(p,b(p),θ ,T ) = (θ + γT b(p)XH− p), as in Section 3.1. Therefore, if
Uδ
T
(q, p,τ,θ ,T ) is used to denote consumer utility when audit is possible, the expected utility for
a consumer who chooses not to audit is given by:14
E[U0(q, p,τ,θ ,T )|b(p)]≡ (θ + γT b(p)XH − p)
2
2
.
13It will be shown that the consumer’s taste level does not affect the auditing decision, and therefore θ is not an
argument of the function δT .
14Note that assumptions A.1 and A.1′ are again sufficient allow the omission of max[θ + γT b(p)XH − p,0] in the
derivation of consumer demand in this section; that is, these assumptions guarantee that θ + γT b(p)XH − p ≥ 0 for all
consumers types and all b(p) ∈ [0,1].
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The same consumer who incurs a to know the firm’s type will choose q(p,1,θ ,T ) = θ + γT XH − p
when the firm is the high type and q(p,0,θ ,T )) = θ − p when the firm is the low type. Thus the
expected utility for this consumer is:
E[U1(q, p,τ,θ ,T )|b(p)]≡ b(p)((θ + γT XH − p)
2
2
−a)+(1−b(p))((θ − p)
2
2
−a)
=
(θ + γT b(p)XH − p)2
2
+
(1−b(p))b(p)(XH)2 γ2T
2
−a
= E[U0(q, p,τ,θ ,T )|b(p)]+ (1−b(p))b(p)(XH)
2 γ2T
2
−a.
Therefore, since the consumer makes the audit decision by comparing these two expected utilities,
the following Lemma results.
Lemma 4. At any price p, a consumer of type T with beliefs b(p) will choose to incur the cost a in
order to know the firm’s type if and only if:
a<
b(p)(1−b(p))(XH)2 (γT )2
2
.
Note that the audit decision does not depend on the consumer’s base level of taste, θ , as the con-
tribution to utility from non-X-related taste does not depend upon the firm’s type. In addition, the
benefit for auditing depends upon the beliefs at the given price, but not the price itself. If the beliefs
are close to 0 or 1 (the consumer is fairly sure the firm is a particular type), there is less benefit from
auditing (or, alternatively, a lower cost of basing the purchasing decision on beliefs), and therefore
the consumer will choose not to audit. This leads to the following characterization15 of δ T (p,b(p)):
δ T (p,b(p)) =

1 if b(p) ∈ (0,1) and a< b(p)(1−b(p))(XH)2(γT )2
0 otherwise.
15 For simplicity, it is assumed that consumers in the model play pure strategies, and that every consumer of a given
type will make the same audit decision. It can be shown that the equilibria of the model with pure auditing strategies are
also equilibria of the model with the possibility of consumers playing mixed auditing strategies, and moreover, additional
equilibria are only possible if λ (1−λ ) is exactly equal to 2a
(XH )
2(γT )2
.
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II.4.2 Separating Equilibria
As in the model of Section 3 (without consumer audit), a separating equilibrium consists of
equilibrium prices for both of the firm’s types, psepL and p
sep
H , together with consumer beliefs, b(p),
such that psepL 6= psepH , and no party wishes to deviate from the equilibrium. As the consumer knows
the price before making the audit decision, and the supporting beliefs for the separating equilibria
of Section 3.2 take values of only 0 or 1 (including out-of-equilibrium beliefs), there will be no
consumer audit and these same beliefs support the same separating equilibria in the current model.
Therefore, the unique (refined) separating equilibrium for each case in Section 3.2 is also a separat-
ing equilibrium for the corresponding case when the consumer has the option to audit. In addition
to this, note that Lemma 2 and Lemma 3 will still hold, as consumers will never choose to audit in
a separating equilibrium; thus the weak firm type will be fully identified and will have incentive to
deviate from any price other than the full-information price. Furthermore, there exists no separating
equilibrium in which the strong firm type chooses a less-distorted price, as consumers do not audit
in a separating equilibrium and the weak firm type would then have incentive to deviate. Finally,
all separating equilibria in which the strong firm type chooses a more distorted price will not satisfy
the Intuitive Criterion; this due to the fact that the Intuitive Criterion compares profits where beliefs
equal 1 or 0, and is thereby unaffected by consumer audit. Therefore, the only separating equilib-
rium that is possible when consumers have the choice of auditing occurs at the same prices as the
unique (for each case) separating equilibrium from Section 3.2, yielding the following result.
Proposition 5. The unique (refined) separating equilibrium for each case of the model without
consumer audit is also the unique (refined) separating equilibrium for the corresponding case of the
model with consumer audit.
II.4.3 Single Price Equilibria
Although the unique separating equilibrium from the base model without consumer audit is
still an equilibrium of the model with the possibility of consumer audit, there is different type of
equilibrium, analogous to the pooling equilibria discussed in Section 3, that must be considered.
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Defn. A “single-price” equilibrium consists of an equilibrium price pair, (pSPL , pSPH ), together with
consumer beliefs, b(p), and the audit decision function for each consumer type, δA(p,b(p)) and
δ S(p,b(p)), such that pSPL = pSP = pSPH , b(pSP) = λ , and both expected profits and expected utility
are maximized.
While this definition may seem identical to that of the classical pooling equilibrium because both
firm types charge the same price, there is an important difference in the consumer’s information at
the time of purchase. In a classic pooling equilibrium, the consumer would use prior beliefs (the
same beliefs as before price was observed) about the firm’s type in order to make a purchasing
decision. In this model, however, some or all of the consumers may choose to become fully informed
via audit before the purchase is made, and therefore the resulting equilibrium is distinct from the
classic pooling equilibrium. While all of the included single-price equilibria are pooling equilibria in
the sub-game up to the consumer’s audit decision (where all consumers are still using prior beliefs),
those consumers that choose to audit learn the firm’s type and revise their beliefs accordingly, and
thus the only equilibria that are identical to classic pooling equilibria are those in which no consumer
chooses to audit; in that case, the consumer’s posterior beliefs, b(p), will be identical to prior beliefs
as no information about the firm s type is learned via price or audit.
Since a single-price equilibrium with price pSP necessarily requires b(pSP) = λ (the true pro-
portion of high type firms), Lemma 4 results in four possible cases (using λ̂ = .5λ (1− λ )X2H).
First, if a> λ̂ γ2S and a> λ̂ γ2A, then δA(pSP,λ ) = 0 = δ S(pSP,λ ); that is, no consumers will choose
to verify the firm’s type by auditing at the single price. Second, if a ≤ λ̂ γ2S and a ≤ λ̂ γ2A, then
δA(pSP,λ ) = 1= δ S(pSP,λ ); that is, all consumers will choose to verify the firm’s type by auditing
at the single price. If λ̂ γ2A < a≤ λ̂ γ2S , then δA(pSP,λ ) = 0 and δ S(pSP,λ ) = 1; that is, only X-seeker
consumers will choose to verify the firm’s type at the shared price. Finally, if λ̂ γ2S < a≤ λ̂ γ2A, then
δA(pSP,λ ) = 1 and δ S(pSP,λ ) = 0; that is, only X-avoider consumers will choose to verify the
firm’s type at the shared price. The intuition behind this result is fairly straightforward. Refer again
to the example of a product with foreign inputs, and suppose that γA is very large (and negative),
implying that the proportion of foreign inputs has a substantial effect on the utility of X-avoider
consumers (less foreign inputs yield higher utility). The loss due to purchasing too much of a high-
foreign-input product is therefore very high, and thus X-avoiders would choose to incur a. Similarly,
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if γS is very large, X-seekers would choose to incur a rather than facing the possibility of purchasing
the incorrect amount of the product. Intermediate values of γS and γA result in lower losses from
basing the purchasing decision on beliefs alone, and thus in these cases consumers choose not to
incur a.
While b(p) = λ must be true at the single price in equilibrium, it is important to note that this
is not the case for out-of-equilibrium beliefs. Out-of-equilibrium beliefs may not only differ from
λ , but may also result in a different combination of consumers (if any) choosing to audit at a given
out-of-equilibrium price.16
Clearly, consumer demand and subsequent firm profits will depend upon which consumers (if
any) choose to audit. Furthermore, when at least one type of consumer chooses to audit at a given
price, consumer demand at that price will depend upon the product’s type, τ . As a result, individual
consumer demand will now be denoted by qδ
T
(p,τ,b(p),θ ,T ), where δ T (p,b(p)) denotes the audit
decision for type T consumers at price p given beliefs b(p). Following the derivations of demand
in Sections 2.2 and 3.1, a type T consumer with base taste level θ will make the audit decision
δ T (p,b(p) at price p, and if the consumer’s taste level is given by θ , the consumer’s demand for a
type τ product will be denoted by:
qδ
T
(p,τ,b(p),θ ,T ) =

θ + γT b(p)XH − p if δ T = 0,
θ + γT Xτ − p if δ T = 1,
By taking the expectation of demand over consumer types and integrating (aggregating) this over all
possible consumer taste levels, the aggregate expected demand for a type τ product of price p under
posterior consumer beliefs b(p), with audit decisions δA(p,b(p)) and δ S(p,b(p)) is given by:
16 Note that Lemma 4 implies that out-of-equilibrium beliefs can cannot “switch” from having only one type of con-
sumer auditing to having only the other type of consumer auditing; for example, if only X-seekers audit in the equilibrium,
then out-of-equilibrium beliefs cannot induce only X-avoiders to audit at out-of-equilibrium prices, as the former requires
γA < γS while the latter implies γA > γS.
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QδAδS(p,τ,b(p)) =

.5+θ +ωb(p)XH − p if δA = 0 = δ S,
α(.5+θ + γAb(p)XH − p)
+(1−α)(.5+θ + γSXτ − p) if δA = 0 and δ S = 1,
α(.5+θ + γAXτ − p)
+(1−α)(.5+θ + γSb(p)XH − p) if δA = 1 and δ S = 0,
.5+θ +ωXτ − p if δA = 1 = δ S.
Given this, the expected profits for each type at price p given ex-ante consumer beliefs b(p) and the
consumer audit decisions δA(p,b(p)) and δ S(p,b(p)) are denoted by:
Πδ
Aδ S(p,H,b(p)) = pQδAδS(p,H,b(p)) (II.11)
Πδ
Aδ S(p,L,b(p)) = (p− c)QδAδS(p,L,b(p)). (II.12)
II.4.3.1 Case 1: No Consumers Audit
This section analyzes the single price equilibria in which both types of consumer will choose not to
incur the cost a to determine the firm’s type at the single price. This case arises when:
a> λ̂ γ2S and a> λ̂ γ
2
A.
As mentioned previously, this results in the single-price equilibria of this subsection being identical
to classic pooling equilibria, and therefore these equilibria are called full pooling equilibria. Since
no consumers choose to audit in a full pooling equilibrium, all consumers base their purchasing
decisions on their beliefs at the full pooling price ppool (where these beliefs are equal to λ ). As
no additional information is learned by consumers, any full pooling price would be identical to
the pooling prices in the model of asymmetric information without audit and without disclosure
discussed in Section 3.3. Since employing the Intuitive Criterion involves comparing profits when
beliefs are equal to 0 or 1 (beliefs for which consumers never choose to audit), adding the possibility
of audit does not affect whether a pooling equilibrium will satisfy the Intuitive Criterion. Therefore,
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these equilibria will fail refinement as in Section 3.3. This results in the following proposition.
Proposition 6. There exists no full pooling equilibrium (a single-price equilibrium in which no
consumers choose to audit) that satisfies the Intuitive Criterion.
Intuitively, this proposition results from audit being too costly from the perspective of the consumer.
As a result, the firm is unable to shift the cost of informing consumers onto the consumers them-
selves. Therefore, the firm type that wishes to be identified must use price signaling in order to
reveal its type, and only the separating equilibrium survives refinement.
II.4.3.2 Case 2: All Consumers Audit
This section analyzes the single price equilibria in which both types of consumer will choose to
incur the audit cost a to determine the firm’s type at the single price. This case arises when:
a≤ λ̂ γ2S and a≤ λ̂ γ2A.
As a result, all consumers choose to audit and the firm faces fully-informed consumers at any single-
price equilibrium. To distinguish from other single-price equilibria, these equilibria will be called
single-price-full-audit (SPFA) equilibria. Suppose ω < 0; then the firm’s low type is strong and
always prefers to be thought of as a low type at any given price. Furthermore, since the high type
is identified through audit by all consumers in an SPFA equilibrium, pSPFA = p f ullH maximizes the
profits for the high type over all SPFA equilibria. Given this, suppose (in addition to ω < 0) that
there exists an SPFA equilibrium such that pSPFA 6= p f ullH . In this case it can easily be shown that
there will always exist a price, p′, between pSPFA and p f ullH (an ε deviation) such that if b(p
′) = 1,
then the high type would wish to deviate to p′ while the low type would not. Thus refinement by
the Intuitive Criterion implies b(p′) = 1, and no such SPFA equilibrium exists; therefore, it must
be that if ω < 0, then pSPFA = p f ullH in any SPFA equilibrium. If ω > 0 (the low type is the weak
type), a similar argument requires pSPFA = p f ullL . Therefore, the weak type, depending on the sign
of ω , must make full-information profits in order for an SPFA equilibrium to exist; this leads to the
following lemma.17
17When ω = 0 there is no incentive for either type to mimic, and therefore no single-price equilibria will exist because
one firm would always have incentive to deviate to its full-information price
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Lemma 5. Suppose there exists an SPFA equilibrium price in which both consumer types choose
to audit. If ω < 0, then any p 6= p f ullH cannot be an SPFA equilibrium price. If ω > 0, then any
p 6= p f ullL cannot be a SPFA equilibrium price.
As a result of the above, there can be at most a single SPFA equilibrium. The following proposi-
tion provides conditions under which a unique SPFA equilibrium will exist, and is proved in the
appendix.
Proposition 7. Suppose that a≤ λ̂ γ2S and a≤ λ̂ γ2A. For ω < 0, if 2c−ωXH < z1, then there exists a
unique single-price-full-audit equilibrium that satisfies the Intuitive Criterion wherein pSPFA = p f ullH
with supporting beliefs given by b(p) = λ if p = p f ullH and b(p) = 1 otherwise. For ω > 0, if
max{c,2(c−ωXH)} < z2, there exists a unique SPFA equilibrium under the Intuitive Criterion in
which pSPFA = p f ullL with supporting beliefs given by b(p) = λ if p = p
f ull
L and b(p) = 0 otherwise.
Note that the conditions for existence in each case of Proposition 9 result in non-empty sets. To
see this, first consider the conditions involving the auditing decision (a ≤ λ̂ γ2S ,a ≤ λ̂ γ2A). Both of
these constraints allow ω to take on any value as there are no other restrictions on α (the proportion
of X-avoiders) and a other than a > 0 and α ∈ (0,1). As a result, there are few constraints on the
values of the parameters in the condition
2c−ωXH < z1 =
√
−2ωXH(.5+θ)− (ωXH)2. (II.13)
To see that the set of parameters meeting these conditions is nonempty, note that c > 0 allows c to
be sufficiently small to satisfy condition (II.13) since z1 is independent of c, and is greater than ωXH
when ω < 0 (by A.1′). Thus for any set of values for the other parameters (meeting the assumptions
of the model) there will exist a range of values for c, albeit possibly very close to zero, for which
this condition will be met and such an equilibrium exists. Note also that a c close to zero is not
necessary for the SPFA equilibrium to exist, only sufficient to guarantee existence (a large value for
θ can achieve the same effect). For the condition
max{c,2(c−ωXH)}< z2 =
√
2ωXH(.5+θ − c)+(ωXH)2, (II.14)
it is again clear that for any set of parameter values meeting the assumptions of the model, with
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ω > 0, there will exist a value for c > 0 small enough to meet condition (II.14). Note again that
this is not necessary, but sufficient for the condition to be met (a large value for θ can achieve the
same effect). Intuitively, both of these conditions ((II.13) and (II.14)) require the distortion in the
separating equilibrium to be “large” relative to the difference between the profits for the firm’s two
types when they are fully identified (a function of c and ωXH), thereby guaranteeing the loss in
profits due to the price distortion in the separating equilibrium will be larger than the loss in profits
due to the strong firm type charging the full-information price of the weak firm type. Therefore,
these conditions eliminate the incentive to deviate from the SPFA equilibrium and allow beliefs to
satisfy the Intuitive Criterion.
II.4.3.3 Case 3: Only X-Avoiders Audit
This case analyzes the single price equilibria in which only the X-avoider consumers choose to
incur the cost a to determine the firm’s type at the single price. These equilibria will be called
single-price-avoider-audit (SPAA) equilibria, and may arise when:
a> λ̂ γ2S and a≤ λ̂ γ2A.
Therefore, X-avoiders will maximize their utility based on the true firm type, while X-seekers will
base their purchasing decision upon beliefs. The following proposition results from refinement by
the Intuitive Criterion, and is proved in the technical appendix for this paper.
Proposition 8. There exists no single-price avoider-audit equilibrium (an equilibrium in which
both of the firm’s types charge the same price and only X-avoiders choose to audit) that satisfies the
Intuitive Criterion.
While this result may appear counterintuitive at first glance, the key to understanding why these
equilibria fail refinement lies in the relative costs/benefits of avoider-only audit to each of the firm’s
types. In this case the cost of audit is small enough for X-avoiders to bear the burden of becoming
informed; however, it is not small enough for X-seekers to become informed. When the firm passes
the burden of becoming informed on to consumers, only X-avoiders choose to audit, and a single-
price equilibrium benefits the low type and hurts the high type. The X-avoiders fully identify the
firm’s type, and will therefore purchase the same quantities that would be purchased under full
36
information (at a given price). X-seekers, however, are unsure of the firm’s type at a single-price
equilibrium and must therefore base their purchasing decision on posterior beliefs (b(p)) about
the firm’s type. This causes X-seekers to purchase a larger quantity of the low-type product and
a smaller quantity of the high-type product than would be purchased under full information (at
a given price). As a result, the high type, regardless of the proportion of X-avoiders versus X-
seekers (given by α) and their relative preferences over X (given by γA and γS), would prefer to
be identified. The Intuitive Criterion simply assumes that X-seekers understand that their lack of
information negatively affects the high type (X-seeker’s “preferred” type) and positively affects the
low type, so that beliefs must reflect a greater willingness for the high type to deviate than for the
low type to deviate. Although this does not change the fact that for any price p in which b(p) = λ ,
X-avoiders have incentive to audit while X-seekers do not, it does result in the high type having
incentive to deviate from the SPAA equilibrium price given any beliefs that satisfy the Intuitive
Criterion. Therefore all possible beliefs that support SPAA equilibria fail refinement, and the firm
is forced to bear the burden of informing the consumer through price separation.
II.4.3.4 Case 4: Only X-Seekers Incur a
This case analyzes the single price equilibria in which only X-seeker consumers choose to incur the
cost a to determine the firm’s type at the single price. These equilibria will be called single-price-
seeker-audit (SPSA) equilibria, and may arise when:
a≤ λ̂ γ2S and a> λ̂ γ2A.
Therefore, X-seekers will maximize their utility based on the true firm type, while X-avoiders will
base their purchasing decision upon beliefs. The following proposition results from refinement by
the Intuitive Criterion, and has a proof analogous to that of Proposition 10.
Proposition 9. There exists no single-price seeker-audit equilibrium (an equilibrium in which both
of the firm’s types charge the same price and only X-seekers choose to audit) that satisfies the
Intuitive Criterion.
As in the previous case, the above result reflects the disparity between the benefits to each of the
firm’s types from a single-price equilibrium. Here the cost of audit is small enough for X-seekers
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to bear the burden of becoming informed; however, it is not small enough for X-avoiders to become
informed. The firm is unable to pass the burden of becoming informed on to consumers, as the
low type is adversely affected and will have sufficient incentive to deviate from the single-price
equilibrium given reasonable beliefs (via the Intuitive Criterion). Therefore, the firm bears the cost
of informing consumers through price separation.
II.4.3.5 Hybrid Equilibria
Similar to the definition of the partial-pooling equilibria in the asymmetric information case without
consumer audit, hybrid equilibria in this case are a broad class of equilibria in which at least one of
the firm’s types plays a mixed pricing strategy, some information about the firm’s type is conveyed
to consumers, and at least one of the equilibrium prices has a positive probability of being charged
by both types. As any equilibrium requires that both of the firm’s types maximize profits given
consumers’ beliefs and audit decision functions, mixed strategies require that profits at all prices
over which a firm type mixes must be equal. Given this, together with the analogous nature between
hybrid equilibrium prices charged by both firm types and the single-price equilibria of this section,
all hybrid equilibria18 fail refinement by the Intuitive Criterion; this is proved in the appendix.
Proposition 10. There exists no hybrid equilibrium that satisfies the Intuitive Criterion.
II.4.4 Welfare and Policy Implications
The main result of Section 4.3 is that the possibility of consumer audit does not affect the
existence of the unique separating equilibria of the model without audit; however, a single-price
equilibrium could possibly arise if both consumer types are willing to incur the audit cost to become
fully informed. This leads to the natural question of which equilibrium is best from a welfare
standpoint when both equilibria are possible, and what, if anything, can be done by a central planner
to arrive at the better of the two equilibria. As the value of ω determines which of the firm’s types
is the strong (high-quality) type, this analysis will be broken into two cases.
18There is a degenerate case in which the strong type can mix over its (distorted) separating price and the weak type’s
full-information price, however, this requires a specific (deterministic) relationship between the parameters (e.g. if ω < 0
it must be that c =−ωXH (.5+θ+ωXH )z1−ωXH ), and is therefore not considered a general result of the model.
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II.4.4.1 Case 1: The Low Type is Strong (ω < 0)
When ω < 0, the price charged by the high type is p f ullH in both the unique separating equilibrium
and in the unique SPFA equilibrium. As a result, the difference in welfare outcomes when the firm
is the high type is only the loss in consumer surplus due to the full mass of consumers (equal to 1)
incurring the audit cost a. Thus, if CSsepH , CS
SPFA
H , PS
sep
H , PS
SPFA
H , T S
sep
H , and T S
SPFA
H , represent the
consumer surplus, producer surplus, and total surplus for both types of equilibria when the firm is
the high type, the following is true.
CSSepH −CSSPFAH = a;
PSSepH −PSSPFAH = 0;
T SSepH −T SSPFAH = a.
Now consider the low type. If the low type firm does not need to distort in the separating equilib-
rium, a SPFA equilibrium will not exist, therefore the welfare results that follow assume that the
low type charges a distorted (upward) price in the separating equilibrium. The difference in each
surplus is as follows:
CSSepL −CSSPFAL = .5(.5+θ − (p f ullL +
z1− c
2
))2− (.5(.5+θ − p f ullH )2−a);
PSSepL −PSSPFAL = ((p f ullL +
z1− c
2
)− c)(.5+θ − (p f ullL +
z1− c
2
))
− (p f ullH − c)(.5+θ − p f ullH ).
Plugging in the values for p f ullH and p
f ull
L and simplifying yields:
CSSepL −CSSPFAL = a− .25(z1−ωXH)(.5+θ −
z1+ωXH
2
);
PSSepL −PSSPFAL = .5(z1−ωXH)(c−
z1+ωXH
2
);
T SSepL −T SSPFAL = a− .25(z1−ωXH)(.5+θ −2c+
z1+ωXH
2
).
It can easily be shown that 2(.5+ θ)−ωXH > z1, and thus the difference in consumer surplus is
negative whenever the audit cost a is small. The difference in producer surplus is always negative
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as profits for the low type are required to be greater in the SPFA equilibrium than in the separating
equilibrium in order for the SPFA equilibrium to exist (and condition (II.13) guarantees this). As a
result, when the firm is the low type and ω < 0, the total surplus for the SPFA equilibrium may be
higher or lower than that of the separating equilibrium, depending on the value of a relative to the
gain in surplus due to decreasing the price to the SPFA equilibrium price. This makes sense since
the firm is a monopoly and the SPFA equilibrium has a lower price (but still above marginal cost)
than the separating equilibrium, resulting in higher total surplus if the audit cost is ignored.
II.4.4.2 The High Type is Strong (ω > 0)
When ω < 0, the price charged by the low type is p f ullL in both the unique separating equilibrium
and in the unique SPFA equilibrium. As a result, the difference in welfare outcomes when the firm
is the low type is only the loss in consumer surplus due to the full mass of consumers (equal to 1)
incurring the audit cost a. Therefore:
CSSepL −CSSPFAL = a;
PSSepL −PSSPFAL = 0;
T SSepL −T SSPFAL = a.
The difference in surplus for when the firm is the high type can be calculated in the same way as for
the low type when ω < 0, and simplifies to:
CSSepH −CSSPFAH = a+ .25(z2−ωXH)(.5+θ − c+ .5z2+1.5ωXH);
PSSepH −PSSPFAH = .5(z2−ωXH)(c−
z2+ωXH
2
);
T SSepH −T SSPFAH = a+ .25(z2)(.5+θ + c− .5z2+ωXH).
Note that by condition (II.14), existence of the SPFA equilibrium requires−.5z2 <ωXH , and thus it
is not possible for the SPFA equilibrium to be more socially efficient than the separating equilibrium.
This makes intuitive sense as the SPFA equilibrium will have a higher price, and thus the total
surplus with a monopolistic firm having marginal costs of zero (the high type) must be lower under
the higher price, despite the greater profits for the high type (required for the existence of the SPFA
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equilibrium).
II.4.4.3 Results and Policy Implications
If the above differences in welfare (where the firm type is known) are defined as the ex-post welfare
comparisons, the ex-ante expected welfare comparisons can be calculated using λ (the probability
of the firm being the high type) and (1−λ ). This results in the following proposition:
Proposition 11. If both the unique separating equilibrium and the unique SPFA equilibrium exist:
i) Ex-post welfare will be at least as high at the unique SPFA equilibrium as the unique separat-
ing equilibrium if and only if consumers prefer the low type product on average (ω < 0), the
firm is the low type, and a ≤ .25(z1−ωXH)(.5+θ −2c+ z1+ωXH2 ), otherwise welfare will be
higher at the unique separating equilibrium.
ii) The ex ante expected welfare will be at least as high at the unique SPFA equilibrium as the
unique separating equilibrium if and only if consumers prefer the low type product on average
(ω < 0) and a< (1−λ ).25(z1−ωXH)(.5+θ−2c+ z1+ωXH2 ), otherwise welfare will be higher
at the unique separating equilibrium.
Intuitively, this is because when ω < 0, consumers (on average) prefer the product that costs
more to produce, and thus separation via price requires upward distortion. As the SPFA equilibrium
has a lower price than that of the separating equilibrium, the SPFA equilibrium will be socially pre-
ferred if the gain in surplus is greater than the loss due to the audit cost. When ω > 0, consumers
prefer the product that is cheaper to produce, and thus separation via price is achieved through a
downward distortion. The SPFA equilibrium price will be above the price in the separating equilib-
rium, and although the firm may have higher profits in the SPFA equilibrium, consumers are worse
off and the total surplus is decreased due to the decreased quantity sold in the SPFA equilibrium.
Now consider possible action by a central planner. If for some reason the central planner knows
the firm to be the low type, and ω is known to be negative, there are conditions such that the
central planner would prefer the SPFA equilibrium.19 If the central planner does not yet know the
firm’s type, but does know that ω is negative, there are still conditions such that the central planner
19A central planner may have access to information about a firm’s product via mandatory product registration, exoge-
nous government audit, etc.
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would prefer the SPFA equilibrium to the unique separating equilibrium (ex-ante). When ω > 0, the
separating equilibrium is always preferred, regardless of the central planners information about the
firm’s type. Though a central planner is able to determine which equilibrium is socially preferred,
the question remains as to how a central planner could lead the market to result in the preferred
equilibrium. Suppose the SPFA equilibrium is both possible and socially preferable. As shown
above, it must be that ω < 0, and the SPFA equilibrium can only exist at p f ullH . The problem for the
central planner is that even if the audit cost a is “small enough,” the existence of the SPFA depends
upon consumer beliefs; if consumers believe that both firm types will charge p f ullH , then the SPFA
will result, otherwise the separating equilibrium will result. A seemingly simple solution would be
for the central planner to fix the price of the good at p f ullH . Provided that consumers are aware of
the fixed price, and can adjust their beliefs accordingly (so that b(p f ullH ) = λ ), fixing the price at
p f ullH would lead to the same total surplus and profits as the SPFA equilibrium. The case in which
the SPFA equilibrium is possible but not preferable is not as simple. If the central planner wishes to
guarantee the separating equilibrium is reached, he or she must somehow convince consumers that
the strong type will never charge the same price as the weak type. The difficulty of this endeavor
is compounded by the fact that the strong type could charge more or less than the weak type in
order to separate (depending on the sign of ω). If the central authority knows the firm’s type, it may
be possible to fix the price at what would have been the separating equilibrium price for the type,
however, this could entail fixing a price higher than the SPFA equilibrium price that could have
resulted.
Though the central planner may not be willing (or able) to guarantee a separating equilibrium
by fixing the price, another possible action would be to adjust the audit cost a. When the separating
equilibrium is preferable, an increase in a could eliminate the possibility of the SPFA equilibrium
altogether, as the incentive for consumers to audit can be eliminated. Though one might believe that
the government is both willing and able to obfuscate information (and possibly adept at doing so),
reducing the availability of product information (increasing a) is a difficult policy recommendation
to make. What can be said, however, is that when central authorities enact laws and/or programs
that seek to provide more information to consumers about products they purchase, social welfare
may benefit from such programs being selective in the products they target as per the above. To
see this, note that if the audit cost a can be affected by the central planner, when ω < 0 and z1 >
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2c−ωXH or when ω > 0 and z2 >max{c,2(c−ωXH)}, an SPFA equilibrium can be made possible
where it was not possible without intervention. As a result, if a central planner determines that a
separating equilibrium is best for a given product (e.g. when the good would be priced lower in
a separating equilibrium than in a SPFA equilibrium), the planner could actually harm welfare by
making information about the product more easily accessible. Furthermore, if the SPFA equilibrium
could exist under lower audit costs, the central planner could increase welfare by lowering a and
inducing a SPFA equilibrium. Therefore, this model predicts that if the central planner is selective
in the products about which it seeks to make information more accessible, social welfare could be
increased.
II.5 Conclusion
The model presented here, wherein a monopolistic firm of two possible types faces a hetero-
geneous consumer base, is primarily designed to analyze the interaction between price signaling
and consumer verification. The price signaling model is first analyzed without the possibility of
verification, and is then analyzed with the possibility of disclosure for the sake of completeness.
Although the model is constructed differently, the price signaling results are similar to previous re-
sults by Daughety and Reinganum (2008a), wherein a unique Perfect Bayesian equilibrium exists
in which the higher-quality firm distorts its price to separate, and if the firm with higher produc-
tion costs produces the high quality product the distortion is upward, while if the lower cost firm
produces the high quality product the distortion is downward. The possibility of consumer audit is
then added to the model, and this also results in a unique separating equilibrium; however, under
certain conditions it is possible that a unique single-price equilibrium will also satisfy the Intuitive
Criterion, wherein all consumers choose to pay the audit cost, and both firm types charge the full
information price of the weak firm type. As these equilibria exist simultaneously, social welfare
at these equilibria are compared, and it is shown that if the strong (high-quality) type is the firm
type with higher production costs, and the audit cost is small enough, the single-price equilibrium
could result in higher social welfare via higher firm profits and increased consumer surplus. Conse-
quently, implications for a central planner facing the possibility of two equilibria are discussed, and
as the results depend upon the availability of product information, it is suggested that in order to
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maximize social welfare, efforts to make product information more accessible to consumers should
be selective in the products they target.
Though the results of the paper are designed to be as complete as possible, there are extensions
that could be made to the model. An intuitive extension would be to add the possibility of disclosure
to the model of signaling and consumer verification. Although the timing of the events in the model
is reasonable (the consumer knows the price before making the audit decision), alternative timing
arrangements could also be considered. Finally, as this model is designed around the effects of
a single product characteristic produced by a monopolist, it may also be interesting to contrast
the results of a similar model with multiple (possibly interdependent) characteristics or multiple
competing firms.
II.6 Appendix
II.6.1 Proof of Proposition 1
By Lemma 2, psepH = p
full
H . Then in order for the high type to have no incentive to deviate to
the low type’s price (psepL ), it must be that Π(p
f ull
H ,H,1)≥Π(psepL ,H,0). Solving this inequality for
psepL yields the following condition:
psepL ≤
.5+θ − z1
2
or
.5+θ + z1
2
≤ psepL . (II.15)
Where z1 =
√
−2ωXH(.5+θ)− (ωXH)2. As −ωXH > 0, the z1 term will be real by assumption
A.1′, and since c > 0, it must be the case that .5+θ−z12 <
.5+θ+c
2 = p
f ull
L . This leaves two cases to
analyze. First, suppose that .5+θ+z12 ≤ pfullL , or equivalently, z1 ≤ c. In this case, psepL = p f ullL will
meet condition (II.15), and since Π(psepL ,H,0)>Π(p,H,0) for all p> p
sep
L , if beliefs are given by
b(p) = 1 if p < psepL and b(p) = 0 otherwise, the full information prices will satisfy the incentive
compatibility constraint (II.3). Since p f ullL maximizes the low type’s profits over all beliefs and all
prices when b(p f ullL ) = 0, the incentive compatibility constraint (II.4) is also met; moreover, since
the high type has no incentive to deviate to p f ullL when b(p
f ull
L ) = 0, refinement by the Intuitive
Criterion eliminates all alternative equilibria in which psepL 6= p f ullL . Therefore, if z1 ≤ c, the unique
44
separating equilibrium satisfying the Intuitive Criterion will be psepH = p
f ull
H and p
sep
L = p
f ull
L , with
supporting beliefs given by b(p) = 1 if p< psepL and b(p) = 0 otherwise.
For the second case, suppose z1 > c. Then
.5+θ−z1
2 < p
f ull
L <
.5+θ+z1
2 , and the low type must
distort from its full information price to separate. Comparing the profits at the cutoffs for psepL
given by condition (II.15) it can be easily shown that 0 < Π
(
.5+θ−z1
2 ,L,0
)
< Π
(
.5+θ+z1
2 ,L,0
)
.
Thus by the strict concavity of the profit function for a fixed b, the price p f ullL +
z1−c
2 =
.5+θ+z1
2
maximizes Π(p,L,0) over all p satisfying condition (II.15). As psepL must satisfy condition (II.15),
and since the high type will have no incentive to deviate to p′ > psepL when b(p
′) = 0, any beliefs
that support an equilibrium price psepL 6= p f ullL + z1−c2 will fail to satisfy the Intuitive Criterion (as
this will require b(p f ullL +
z1−c
2 ) = 0 ). Again consider the beliefs given by b(p) = 1 if p < p
sep
L
and b(p) = 0 otherwise. These beliefs, together with psepL = p
f ull
L +
z1−c
2 and p
sep
H = p
f ull
H will meet
the incentive compatibility constraint (II.3), since Π(p,H,0) < Π(psepL ,H,0) for all p > p
sep
L . To
show that these beliefs and equilibrium prices will meet the incentive compatibility constraint (II.4),
note that it is sufficient to show Π
(
p f ullL +
z1−c
2 ,L,0
)
≥ (maxp≥c Π(p,L,1)), which can be shown
to be the case, and a proof is provided in the technical appendix. Therefore, if c < z1, the unique
separating equilibrium satisfying the Intuitive Criterion will be psepH = p
f ull
H and p
sep
L = p
f ull
L +
z1−c
2 ,
with supporting beliefs given by b(p) = 1 if p< psepL and b(p) = 0 otherwise.
II.6.2 Proof of Proposition 4
Suppose that ppool is the price in a pooling equilibrium. As consumer beliefs must be correct
at the pooling price, it must be that b(ppool) = λ , and profits will be given by Π(ppool,H,λ ) =
ppool(12 +θ +λωXH − ppool) and Π(ppool,L,λ ) = (ppool − c)(12 +θ +λωXH − ppool). There are
now two cases to analyze; the ω < 0 case is shown here, with the ω > 0 being analogous. 20
Given that ω < 0, it must be that the high type is earning profits at least as large as full information
profits, otherwise the high type would deviate to its full information price regardless of beliefs.21.
Therefore, it must be that c < ppool < 12 +θ +λωXh. Solving for the larger of the two prices such
20When ω = 0 firms always have incentive to charge full information prices
21 Note that if the pooling price occurs at the full information price of the high type, then the pooling profits for the
high type are necessarily higher than the high type’s full information profits
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that Π(ppool,H,λ ) =Π(p′H ,H,0) yields:
p′H =
1
2 +θ +
√(1
2 +θ
)2−4ppool (12 +R+λωXH − ppool)
2
,
which can easily be shown to be real as the expression under the square root is a concave quadratic
(in ppool) that is positive at its minimum; moreover, it can easily be shown that ∂Π(p,H,0)∂ p |p′H < 0.
Therefore, by the strict concavity of the profit functions for a fixed b, if b(p) = 0 for any price
p> p′H , the resulting profits for the high type at p would be less than the high type’s pooling profits
at ppool .
Solving for the larger price of the two prices such that Π(ppool,L,λ ) =Π(p′L,L,0) yields,
p′L =
1
2 +θ + c+
√(1
2 +θ + c
)2−4(ppool (12 +θ +λωXH + c− ppool)− cλωXH)
2
,
which can easily be shown to be real as the expression under the square root is a concave quadratic
(in ppool) that is positive at its minimum; moreover, it can easily be shown that ∂Π(p,L,0)∂ p |p′L < 0.
Therefore, for any price p < p′L, if b(p) = 0 the profits for the low type would be greater at p than
at the pooling price. What remains is to prove that p′H < p
′
L, which can be shown, and a proof is
provided in the technical appendix. Therefore there will be a price p between p′H and p
′
L such that
if b(p) = 0, the profit for the high type will be less than the pooling equilibrium profit, but the profit
for the low type will be greater than the pooling equilibrium profit. Thus by the Intuitive Criterion,
the beliefs at this price must be 0, and the pooling equilibrium fails refinement. The ω > 0 case is
similar, and therefore refinement by the Intuitive Criterion eliminates all pooling equilibria of the
model.
To see that there can be no partial-pooling equilibria, suppose that pp−pool is a pooling price that
is part of a partial-pooling equilibrium. As there is a positive probability of either type choosing
pp−pool , let φ ∈ (0,1) denote the true probability that the firm is the high type given the price
pp−pool is observed by consumers. As the above proof that all pooling equilibria fail refinement
by the Intuitive Criterion was derived using an arbitrary λ (which in the demand/profit equations
above is interpreted as the true probability of the firm being the high type given the observed pooling
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price), the same proof can be used to show that the partial-pooling price pp−pool will fail refinement
as well, simply by replacing λ with φ in the analysis. As a result, there will always be at least one
firm with incentive to deviate from pp−pool , and refinement by the Intuitive Criterion will eliminate
all partial-pooling equilibria.
II.6.3 Proof of Proposition 7
Here the case for ω < 0 is shown, with the ω > 0 case being similar and left to the reader. Since
consumers must have correct beliefs in a Perfect Bayesian equilibrium, by Lemma (4) it must be that
a≤ λ̂ γ2S and a≤ λ̂ γ2A in order for both types of consumer to audit in a single-price equilibrium. By
Lemma (15) the only possible SPFA equilibrium price is pSPFA = p f ullH . The incentive compatibility
constraints are then given by:
Π11(p f ullH ,H,λ )≥maxp≥0 Π
δAδS(p,H,b(p)) (II.16)
Π11(p f ullH ,L,λ )≥maxp≥c Π
δAδS(p,L,b(p)) (II.17)
Note that since the firm’s type is known by all consumers in an SPFA equilibrium, the high type
earns full information profits. This implies that the prices at which the high type is indifferent
between charging pSPFA = p f ullH and charging a different price at which b(p) = 0 (mimicking the
low type) are the same as in condition (II.15). Thus if b(p′) = 0 for any p′ such that p′ ≤ .5+θ−z12 or
p′ ≥ .5+θ+z12 , the high type would have no incentive to deviate to p′ from pSPFA.
If z1 ≤ c, then .5+θ+z12 ≤ p f ullL ,and the high type has no incentive to deviate to p f ullL when
b(p f ullL ) = 0. Since p
f ull
L maximizes the profits for the low type over all prices where the low type
is identified, and the firm is identified in an SPFA equilibrium, refinement of the SPFA equilibrium
by the Intuitive Criterion will require b(p f ullL ) = 0 and the SPFA equilibrium will fail. Thus in any
SPFA equilibrium it must be that z1 > c.
If z1 > c, then
.5+θ−z1
2 < p
f ull
L <
.5+θ+z1
2 , and it is easily shown that Π
00( .5+θ−z12 ,L,0) <
Π00( .5+θ+z12 ,L,0). Using p
sep
L =
.5+θ+z1
2 = p
f ull
L +
z1−c
2 , it must be that the SPFA equilibrium profits
for the low type are at least as large as those received by the low type when charging psepL with
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b(psepL ) = 0, or equivalently:
Π11(p f ullH ,L,λ )≥Π00(p f ullL +
z1− c
2
,L,0); (II.18)
otherwise, the Intuitive Criterion would require b(psepL )= 0 and the low type would have incentive to
deviate from p f ullH . It is shown in the proof of Proposition 1 that Π(p
sep
L ,L,0)≥maxp≥cΠ(p,L,1),
which implies Π00(psepL ,L,0) > maxp≥cΠ
00(p,L,1). Therefore, if z1 > c and condition (II.18) is
met, the SPFA equilibrium wherein pSPFA = p f ullH with supporting beliefs given by b(p) = λ if
p = p f ullH and b(p) = 0 otherwise, will satisfy the incentive compatibility constraint (II.16) and
(II.17). Moreover, the strict concavity of the low type’s profit function at a fixed b guarantees the
low type would have no incentive to deviate to any p for which b(p) = 0 that does not satisfy
condition (II.15), and while the low type may have incentive to deviate to some price p that does
satisfy condition (II.15) if b(p) = 0, the high type would also have incentive to deviate to any such
p. Thus the SPFA equilibrium wherein pSPFA = p f ullH with supporting beliefs given by b(p) = λ if
p = p f ullH and b(p) = 0 otherwise will satisfy the Intuitive Criterion. As condition (II.18) reduces
to z1 > 2c−ωXH the necessary and sufficient conditions to guarantee the existence of an SPFA
equilibrium satisfying the Intuitive Criterion in which pSPFA = p f ullH with supporting beliefs given
above are a≤ λ̂ γ2S , a≤ λ̂ γ2A, and z1 >max{c,2c−ωXH}= 2c−ωXH . These conditions are shown
to result in a non-empty set in the main text.
II.6.4 Proof of Proposition 8
Consider a potential SPAA equilibrium price pSPAA. As only X-avoiders audit in the SPAA equi-
librium, this implies that γ2S < γ2A, and the audit decisions at out-of-equilibrium beliefs, (δA,δS), can
only take the form (0,0), (1,0), or (1,1), as (0,1) would require γ2S > γ2A. Given beliefs b(p) and the
audit decisions δA and δS, the profits for the high type when charging a price other than pSPAA are
given by equation (II.11), and the profits for the low type when charging a price other than pSPAA are
given by equation (II.12). If ω < 0, this implies that the lowest possible demand that the low type
could face at a given price p (over all possible beliefs and audit choices) is given by Q00(p,L,1),
yielding profits Π00(p,L,1). As a result, it must be that Π10(pSPAA,L,λ )≥maxpΠ00(p,L,1). Sub-
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sequently, since maxpΠ00(p,L,1)≥Π00(p f ullH ,L,1), the low type would have no incentive to devi-
ate from pSPAA to p f ullH . Therefore, it must be that Π
10(pSPAA,H,λ ) ≥ Π00(p,H,1), otherwise the
Intuitive Criterion would require b(p f ullH ) = 1 and the high type would deviate from the SPAA price.
Finally, (from the proof of Prop 1), since the high type is receiving profits at least as large as those
the separating equilibrium, the high type will have no incentive to deviate to psepL . As a result, the
low type must be earning at least as much profit in the SPAA equilibrium as in the separating equilib-
rium, as otherwise the Intuitive Criterion would require b(psepL ) = 0, and the low type would deviate
from the SPAA price. Now consider if ω > 0. In this case, the lowest possible demand the low type
could receive over all possible beliefs and audit decisions is given by Q00(p,L,0), yielding profits
Π00(p,L,0). Thus the lowest possible profits the low type can receive in the SPAA equilibrium are
given by maxpΠ00(p,L,0), which are exactly the profits the low type would receive in the separat-
ing equilibrium. Moreover, since this implies that the low type has no incentive to deviate to psepH , it
must be that the high type is making SPAA profits at least as large as in the separating equilibrium,
as otherwise the Intuitive Criterion would require b(psepH ) = 1 and the high type would deviate from
the SPAA price. Therefore, regardless of the value of ω , it must be that both firm types are earning
profits at least as large as those of the corresponding separating equilibrium. As a result, for a SPAA
equilibrium to exist, it must be the case that c < pSPAA < .5+θ +αγAXH +(1−α)λγSXH so that
profits for both firm types are positive (as separating equilibrium profits are positive via assumption
A.1′)
Having established that SPAA profits are positive for both types, the proof is split into two cases
(note that there are no longer restrictions on ω). For the first case suppose that (1−α)(1−λ )γS ≤
−αγA, or equivalently,Π10(p,L,λ )≥Π00(p,L,1) for all prices p> c. As this implies that the SPAA
profits for the low type at any price p≥ c are at least as large as the profits the low type could earn
if believed to be the high type at the same price, it must be that Π10(pSPAA,L,λ )≥Π00(pSPAA,L,1).
Since avoider audit implies that Π10(p,H,λ )<Π00(p,H,1) for all p> 0, there will exist an ε price
deviation (upward or downward) such that the low type would have no incentive to deviate, but the
high type would have incentive to deviate (a rigorous derivation of this deviation is provided in the
technical appendix). As a result, the Intuitive Criterion will require b(pSPAA + ε) = 1 and the high
type will deviate from the SPAA price.
Now consider the second case in which (1−α)(1−λ )γS >−αγA, or equivalently,Π10(p,L,λ )<
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Π00(p,L,1) for all prices p such that p ≥ c. Solving for the larger of the two prices such that
Π10(pSPAA,L,λ ) =Π00(p,L,1) yields
p′L = .5
(
.5+θ + c+ωXH
+
√
(.5+θ + c+ωXH)2+4((pSPAA)2− pSPAA(.5+θ + c+(1−α)γSλXH)− c(ω− (1−α)γSλ )X)
)
,
which can easily be shown to be real as the expression under the square root is a concave quadratic
(in pSPAA) that is positive at its minimum under the assumption of this case. Moreover, it can easily
be shown that ∂Π
00(p,L,1)
∂ p |p′L < 0. Therefore by the strict concavity of the profit functions for a fixed
b, if b(p) = 1 for any price p > p′L, the resulting profits for the low type at p would be less than
the low type’s SPAA profits. Solving for the larger of the two prices such that Π10(pSPAA,H,λ ) =
Π00(p,H,1) yields
p′H = .5
(
.5+θ +ωXH
+
√
(.5+θ +ωXH)2+4((pSPAA)2− pSPAA(.5+θ +ωXH − (1−α)(1−λ )γSXH))
)
,
which can easily be shown to be real as the expression under the square root is a concave quadratic
(in pSPAA) that is positive at its minimum under the assumption of this case. Moreover, it can easily
be shown that ∂Π
00(p,H,1)
∂ p |p′H < 0. Therefore by the strict concavity of the profit functions at a fixed
b, if b(p) = 1 for any price p< p′H , the resulting profits for the high type at p would be greater than
the high type’s SPAA profits. What remains to be shown to prove failure of the equilibrium is that
p′L < p
′
H , which can be shown to be the case, and a proof is provided in the technical appendix to
this paper. Therefore, there will always exist a price p between p′L and p
′
H such that if b(p) = 1 the
high type has incentive to deviate but the low type does not, and any beliefs that support an SPAA
equilibria will fail to satisfy the Intuitive Criterion. Furthermore, since the two cases exhaust all
possibilities for SPAA equilibria, refinement by the Intuitive Criterion eliminates all such equilibria.
II.6.5 Proof of Proposition 10
To see why such equilibria cannot exist under consumer audit, assume that phybrid is an equi-
librium price that is part of a hybrid equilibrium of the model wherein both types charge phybrid
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with positive probability. Given this, define φ ∈ (0,1) as the true probability that the firm is the
high type given that the price phybrid is observed. Therefore, since consumer beliefs must be correct
in equilibrium, it must be that b(phybrid) = φ . Given the consumer audit decision functions, there
are now four possibilities to consider. Depending on the parameters of the model, phybrid could
be a full pooling price (wherein no consumers audit), an SPAA price, an SPSA price, or an SPFA
price. Regardless of the which of the four possibilities characterizes phybrid , it is clear that this
price is analogous to the single-price equilibria of this section, with the differences being i) that
the true probability of the firm being the high type is no longer required to be λ , and ii) there are
other prices over which one or both of the firm types are mixing. However, phybrid , together with
φ , must still meet the profit maximization condition and survive refinement by the Intuitive Crite-
rion in order for the hybrid equilibrium to survive refinement. Since Propositions 6-9 are proved
using an arbitrary value for λ (interpreted in the single-price equilibria as the probability of the
firm being the high type given that the single price is observed) these same propositions will ap-
ply to phybrid , simply by replacing λ with the analogous φ . Therefore, it cannot be that phybrid is
a true pooling price, an SPAA price or an SPSA price, as any beliefs that support phybrid would
fail refinement by the Intuitive Criterion (by the proofs of Propositions 6,8 and 9). This leaves the
possibility that phybrid is an SPFA equilibrium; however, this would require that phybrid be equal
to the full information price of the weak type (as the weak type is fully identified at phybrid). To
see why this cannot result in a hybrid equilibrium, consider the case where ω < 0 (with the ω > 0
case being analogous). In order for the equilibrium to be a hybrid equilibrium in this case, one or
both of the firm’s types must be mixing between phybrid = p f ullH and another price. First, suppose
that the high type is mixing between phybrid and another price p′ 6= phybrid . Since the high type is
earning full information profits
(
Π11(p f ullH ,H,φ)
)
at phybrid it must also be earning full information
profits at p′; however, it cannot be the case that p′ is charged only by the high type, as this implies
that the high type is identified and by the strict concavity of the high type’s full information profit
function Π00(p′,H,1)<Π00(p f ullH ,H,φ). Also, it cannot be the case that both firm types charge p
′,
as this would require p′ to be an SPFA price as well (for reasons described above), again implying
Π11(p′,H,1)<Π00(p f ullH ,H,1). Thus the high type could not be playing a mixed strategy in equi-
librium. Now suppose the low type is mixing between phybrid and some price p′ 6= phybrid . Again, p′
cannot be a full pooling price, an SPAA price, or an SPSA price, and as shown above, the high type
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would never choose to mix between phybrid and p′ if it where an SPFA price. Thus it must be that
only the low type charges p′, and thus b(p′) = 0 with no consumers auditing at p′. From the proof of
Proposition 1, p′ cannot be between .5+θ−z12 and p
sep
L =
.5+θ+z1
2 as this would cause the high type to
deviate to p′ (as the high type is earning full information profits at phybrid and could earn larger prof-
its via mimicry by charing p′ in this price range). Additionally, from the proof of Proposition 1 and
by the strict concavity of the low type’s full information profit function, since .5+θ−z12 < p
f ull
L and
Π00( .5+θ−z12 ,L,0)<Π
00(psepL ,L,0)≤Π11(p f ullH ,L,φ), it must be thatΠ00(p,L,0)<Π11(p f ullH ,L,φ)
for all p ≤ .5+θ−z12 ; moreover, Π00(p,L,0)< Π00(psepL ,L,0) for all p > psepL as well. Finally, from
Proposition 7, it must be thatΠ11(p f ullH ,L,φ)≥Π00(psepL ,L,0) in order for phybrid = p f ullH to meet the
conditions of an SPFA equilibrium price. Therefore, the only possible way for a hybrid equilibrium
to exist occurs in the degenerate case when Π11(p f ullH ,L,φ) =Π
00(psepL ,L,0), or equivalently, when
Π(p f ullH ,L,0) = Π(p
sep
L ,L,0) in the case without consumer audit, so that the low type is exactly
indifferent between being fully identified at the high type’s full information price, and being fully
identified at the separating price. Note that this requires a deterministic relationship between the
parameters, in this case c = −ωXH(.5+θ+ωXH)z1−ωXH , and thus this case does not occur in general. There-
fore, refinement by the Intuitive Criterion eliminates all (general) hybrid equilibria in the model
with consumer audit.
II.7 Technical Appendix
II.7.1 Proof of maxp>c Π(p,L,1)≤Π
(
p f ullL +
z1−c
2 ,L,0
)
when c< z1 (For Propositions 1 and
9)
To see that this is the case, assume to the contrary that c− 2ωXH > 2z1, or equivalently after
squaring both sides and rearranging terms,
c(c+4ωXH)+8ωXH(
1
2
+θ +ωXH − c)> 0.
If c+4ωXH ≤ 0, then c(c+4ωXH)+8ωX(12 +θ +ωXH − c)≤ 0, resulting in the desired contra-
diction. Otherwise, if c+4ωXH > 0, note that A.1′ implies −ωXH < z1, and since c< z1:
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c(c+4ωXH)+8ωXH(
1
2
+θ +ωXH − c)
< z1 (z1+4ωXH)+8ωXH(
1
2
+θ +ωX− c)
=−2ωXH(12 +θ)− (ωXH)
2+4ωXHz1+8ωXH(
1
2
+θ +ωXH − c)
= ωXH
(
6(
1
2
+θ +ωXH − c)+(ωXH −2c+4z1)
)
< 0.
Thus c+ 4ωXH > 0 results in a contradiction as well. Thus it must be that c− 2ωXH ≤ 2z1, and
maxp>cΠ(p,L,1)≤Π
(
p f ullL +
z1−c
2 ,L,0
)
when c< z1.
II.7.2 Proof that p′H < P
′
L for Proposition 4
Suppose to the contrary that p′H ≥ p′L, or equivalently (after simplifying, squaring both sides,
and rearranging) that:
1
2
+θ + c−2ppool +2λωXH +
√
(
1
2
+ c+θ)2−4(−p∗2−λcωXH + ppool(12 + c+θ +λωXH))≤ 0
Then since ω < 0 and ppool < 12 +θ +λωXH ,
1
2
+θ + c−2ppool +2λωXH +
√
(
1
2
+θ + c)2−4(−p∗2−λcωXH + ppool(12 + c+θ +λωXH))
=
1
2
+θ + c−2ppool +2λωXH
+
√
(
1
2
+θ + c−2ppool +2λωXH)2+2ppoolλωXH −4(.5+θ +λωXH)λωXH
>
1
2
+θ + c−2ppool +2λωXH
+
√
(
1
2
+θ + c−2ppool +2λωXH)2+2(.5+θ +λωXH)λωXH −4(.5+θ +λωXH)λωXH
=
1
2
+θ + c−2ppool +2λωXH +
√
(
1
2
+θ + c−2ppool +2λωXH)2−2(.5+θ +λωXH)λωXH
>
1
2
+θ + c−2ppool +2λωXH +
√
(
1
2
+θ + c−2ppool +2λωXH)2
≥ 0,
a contradiction. Thus p′H < p
′
L for all values of θ , XH , and c when ω < 0.
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II.7.3 Derivation of the ε price deviation for Proposition 10
There are two sub cases to consider. First, suppose that pSPAA ≤ argmax{Π10(p,H,λ )}, that
is, the SPAA equilibrium price is no larger than the price that would maximize the low type’s
profits in a SPAA equilibrium. Now consider the profits for both types at the price pSPAA− ε1 when
b(pSPAA− ε1) = 1, and ε1 is defined by:
0<ε1 <min
{
pSPAA− c, .5(−(.5+θ +(αγA+(1−α)γS)XH −2pSPAA)
+
√
(.5+θ +(αγA+(1−α)γS)XH −2pSPAA)2+4(1−α)(1−λ )γS pSPAA )
}
.
Note that the latter expression in this minimum can easily be shown to be positive under the assump-
tions of the model. As Π10(p,L,λ ) will be strictly increasing22 in p at pSPAA, and Π10(p,L,λ ) ≥
Π00(p,L,1) for all p > c, it must be that Π10(pSPAA,L,λ ) > Π00(pSPAA− ε1,L,1) so that the low
type would have no incentive to deviate from pSPAA if beliefs b(pSPAA− ε1) = 1. The profits for the
high type at pSPAA−ε1 are given byΠ00(pSPAA−ε1,H,1), and these profits are greater than the high
type’s profits in the SPAA equilibrium when:
(pSPAA− ε)(.5+θ +(αγA+(1−α)γS)XH − pSPAA+ ε)
> (pSPAA)(.5+θ +αγAXH +(1−α)γSλXH).
This results in a quadratic inequality in ε1, with solution given by:
.5
(
− (.5+θ +(αγA+(1−α)γS)XH −2pSPAA)
−
√
(.5+θ +(αγA+(1−α)γS)XH −2pSPAA)2+4(1−α)(1−λ )γS pSPAA
)
< ε1 < .5
(
− (.5+θ +(αγA+(1−α)γS)XH −2pSPAA)
+
√
(.5+θ +(αγA+(1−α)γS)XH −2pSPAA)2+4(1−α)(1−λ )γS pSPAA
)
,
where the lower bound is always negative and the upper bound is always positive. As a result, the
22If pSPAA = argmax{Π10(p,H,λ ), then Π10(p,L,1λ ) will not be strictly increasing at pSPAA; however, Π10(p,L,λ )
will be strictly less for all p< pSPAA.
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high type will earn larger profits by deviating to pSPAA−ε1 when b(pSPAA−ε1) = 1. Thus there will
always be a price p< pSPAA for which b(p) = 1 will provide incentive for the high type to deviate,
but no incentive for the low type to deviate. Therefore there are no SPAA equilibria in this subcase
that satisfy the Intuitive Criterion.
For the second case suppose that pSPAA > argmax{Π(p,XH ,1,0;λ ). A similar argument to that
of the previous subcase shows that if b(pSPAA+ ε2) = 1, where ε2 is defined:
0<ε2 <min
{
.5+θ +(αγA+(1−α)γSλ )XH − pSPAA, .5
(
(.5+θ +(αγA+(1−α)γS)XH −2pSPAA)
+
√
(.5+θ +(αγA+(1−α)γS)XH −2pSPAA)2+4(1−α)(1−λ )γS pSPAA
)}
,
then the high type would have incentive to deviate to pSPAA + ε , while the low type would not.
Therefore any SPAA equilibrium in this subcase will not satisfy the Intuitive Criterion. As the two
subcases above exhaust the possibilities of the larger case, there are is no SPAA equilibrium in
whichΠ10(p,L,λ )≥Π00(p,L,1) (ie. (1−α)(1−λ )γS ≥−αγA) that satisfy the Intuitive Criterion.
II.7.4 Proof that p′L < p
′
H for Proposition 10
To show that p′L < p
′
H , or equivalently (simplifying, squaring both sides, and rearranging)
2pSPAA(αγAXH)+ c(.5+θ −ωXH +2(1−α)γSλXH −2pSPAA)
− c
√
(.5+θ +ωXH)2+4((pSPAA)2− pSPAA(.5+θ +ωXH − (1−α)(1−λ )γSXH))< 0.
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Then
2pSPAA(αγAXH)+ c(.5+θ −ωXH +2(1−α)γSλXH −2pSPAA)
− c
√
(.5+θ +ωXH)2 +4((pSPAA)2− pSPAA(.5+θ +ωXH − (1−α)(1−λ )γSXH))
=2pSPAA(αγAXH)+ c(.5+θ −ωXH +2(1−α)γSλXH −2pSPAA)
− c
√
(.5+θ +ωXH −2pSPAA)2 +4pSPAA(1−α)(1−λ )γSXH
<2pSPAA(αγAXH)+ c(.5+θ −ωXH +2(1−α)γSλXH −2pSPAA)− c
√
(.5+θ +ωXH −2pSPAA)2
=2pSPAA(αγAXH)+ c(.5+θ −ωXH +2(1−α)γSλXH −2pSPAA)− c|(.5+θ +ωXH −2pSPAA)|
=2pSPAA(αγAXH)+ c(.5+θ +ωXH −2pSPAA)− c|(.5+θ +ωXH −2pSPAA)|+ c(−2ωXH +2(1−α)γSλXH)
=2pSPAA(αγAXH)+ c(.5+θ +ωXH −2pSPAA)− c|(.5+θ +ωXH −2pSPAA)|+ c(−2αγA−2(1−α)(1−λ )γS)XH
< 0
since (1−α)(1−λ )γS >−αγA. Thus it must be that p′L < p′H . Therefore there will always exist a
price p between p′L and p
′
H such that if b(p) = 1 the high type has incentive to deviate but the low
does not, and any SPAA equilibria in this case will fail to satisfy the Intuitive Criterion.
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CHAPTER III
ASSESSING THE VALUE OF A PROXY FOR CONSUMER HEALTH CONSCIEN-
TIOUSNESS IN THE ESTIMATION OF DEMAND
III.1 Introduction
Nutrition is currently an active area of policy debate because of its potential to reduce obesity
rates as well as other associated health problems. Disentangling the effects heterogeneity in healthy
vs unhealthy eating habits is not only an important step toward understanding how consumer health
can be improved, but is also important in determining a firm’s optimal strategy across markets in
which consumer preferences over a product’s “healthiness” differ. To this end, we seek to assess
the value of a proxy variable for consumer health conscientiousness in estimation of demand for
products wherein a brand’s healthiness may be of concern. Naturally, a consumer’s determination
of a product’s healthiness is a matter of perception, which could be argued to be a function of any
number of observable and unobservable product characteristics together with the consumers’ level
of concern for their health (consumer health conscientiousness). One could attempt to perform an
analysis that controls for heterogeneity in the perception of a product’s healthiness. However, a
complicated analysis of perception is unnecessary given our stated goal (and would almost neces-
sarily be confined to an experimental setting). We proceed by investigating the significance of the
coefficients on the interactions of a variable measuring health conscientiousness with observable
product characteristics in the estimation of demand across a category wherein a brand’s “healthi-
ness” is important to some consumers.
The ideal dataset for such a study would be a panel of individual (household) purchases, com-
plete with demographic information including a variable serving as a measure of health conscien-
tiousness. Given such a dataset, the analysis would be a straightforward application of discrete
choice, such as a random coefficients logit model. However, to our knowledge no such panel cur-
rently exists. Therefore, we apply the discrete choice model presented in Nevo (2001) to a simulated
population of households combining data from both the Current Population Survey (henceforth
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CPS) and the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System (henceforth BRFSS) in order to asso-
ciate each household with a dummy variable for smoking. Given the well known and very serious
health implications of smoking, the result is a simulated panel of households for each city that in-
cludes an easily justifiable proxy variable for consumer health conscientiousness. This dataset is
then used to investigate whether or not the coefficients on the interaction of the smoking dummy
and health-related product characteristics are statistically significant in the estimation of demand in
the ready-to-eat cereal market; a category chosen for the substantial variation in the characteristics
associated with healthy eating, such as sugar, fat, and fiber content, and for the variety of brands
that target health-conscious consumers.
This investigation is of interest for two reasons. First, if consumer health conscientiousness is
an important component in the decisions of consumers and firms, models that do not adequately
control for this could produce biased estimates. Thus, the significance of the interactions in this
paper should be of interest to both marketers and economists. Obviously, knowing that a variable
is important is somewhat moot if the variable is not available in the data. To this end, our analysis
also provides necessary evidence for firms considering the collection of health-related demographic
variables, as there are significant costs in collecting, storing, and protecting consumer data. The final
reason that the results of this paper are important is that if the fairly basic interactions considered
in this model have significant effects on demand, it stands to reason that a more complex model of
consumer perception, product “healthiness” and product characteristics is justified and potentially
valuable to marketing academics and practitioners.
III.1.1 Outline
Section 2 of this paper describes the consumer demand model. Section 3 provides a description
of the data used in the estimation. Section 4 outlines the estimation procedure, and Section 5
provides the results of the structural estimation. Section 6 concludes the paper.
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III.1.2 Related Literature
To our knowledge, there are no papers that use proxy variables for consumer health conscien-
tiousness in the estimation of demand for a product. However, there is a substantial literature in
the field of marketing consumer behavior that relates to our goal. Andrews, Burton, and Netemeyer
(2000), Kozup, Creyer, and Burton (2003), Raghunathan, Naylor, and Hoyer (2006), and Downs,
Loewenstein, and Wisdom (2009) are all examples of research directed at how consumers choose
healthy versus unhealthy products. These papers investigate the effects of nutrition claims, infor-
mation disclosure, and consumer perception on such choices. Though interesting and related, these
papers are the result of experimental work and yield no information with respect to our stated goal
other than suggesting that health conscientiousness may be valuable in the estimation of demand.1
As mentioned in the previous section, there is currently no individual-level panel dataset com-
plete with purchases and demographic information about consumer health conscientiousness. There-
fore, we use city-level scanner data together with demographic information from other sources to
create and analyze a model of individual demand at the aggregate level. The prominent paper by
Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995), henceforth BLP, develops the random-coefficients logit model
for aggregate data that is used in our analysis. This method allows the use of instrumental variables
to control for the endogeneity of prices, and is applied to the US automobile market (at the aggregate
level) to derive estimates for elasticities that allow for consumer heterogeneity in a structural model
without the unreasonable substitution patterns resulting from a basic multinomial logit analysis. A
key step in the process of estimation is the inversion of the market shares via simulation with a
technique presented in Berry (1994), alternatives to which are discussed in the conclusion of this
paper.
The model most similar to what we apply to our data is that of Nevo (2001), wherein he applies
the method of BLP to panel data from the IRI Marketing data set. A nice feature of this model is
that the panel structure allows the inclusion of brand-specific dummy variables, allowing for the
assumption of the exogeneity of product characteristics (required in BLP) to be relaxed. Nevo uses
this method to investigate the strategic behavior/market power of firms in the ready-to-eat cereal
1 The results from the consumer behavior literature may not be directly applicable to the model presented here, but
could be quite useful in the construction of a model that controls for consumer perception in the estimation of demand.
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industry. Though similar in construction, there are several differences between Nevo’s methodol-
ogy and what we present here. First, Nevo is not interested in consumer health conscientiousness.
More importantly, since Nevo does not control for health conscientiousness, any residual effects of
health conscientiousness not picked up by his demographic variables (age and income) are left in
the error term. As a result, if health conscientiousness is considered by firms in the pricing decision,
it must be assumed that health conscientiousness is uncorrelated across the markets within the dif-
ferent Census regions (South, Northeast, Midwest, West) for Nevo’s price instruments to be valid.
Another difference between Nevo’s model and our model is the determination of the size of each
market in the sample. Nevo simply sets the number of people in the market to the population of
the corresponding city. However, the stores in the IRI dataset are far from a census of the stores in
each city, and thus Nevo’s estimate of market size is a sizable overestimate. Moreover, the degree of
overestimation varies in magnitude from city to city, as the number (and size) of stores from which
data is collected in each city is not proportional to population. Alternatively, we seek to estimate the
number of people “served” by each store in the dataset, then aggregate this number over the stores
in each city to construct our market size estimates.
III.2 Consumer Demand
As mentioned in the previous section, there does not currently exist a panel dataset with individual-
level purchases together with a proxy variable for health conscientiousness. Therefore, to answer
the question at hand we adapt the model of consumer demand described in Nevo (2001), applicable
to aggregate-level datasets, wherein a consumer is assumed to either purchase a single unit of the
good2 or take the outside option. Suppose that for each of m= 1, ...,M markets there are i= 1, ...,Im
consumers, and j = 1, ...,Jm brands, together with a K-dimensional row vector of observable prod-
uct characteristics x j (other than price). Given this, if p jm is the price of brand j in market m and yi
is consumer i’s income, the indirect utility that consumer i receives from consuming a single unit of
2 The calculation of observed market shares is made via an assumption on the maximum amount of cereal a person
can consume in a single sitting (Nevo uses a maximum of 1 serving per day, per consumer). Thus the unit demand
assumption can be justified as reflecting a per-sitting decision, or can simply be viewed as a reasonable approximation
to true consumer demand. It is worth noting that there are recent papers that relax the unit demand assumption, such as
Nevo, Rubinfield, and McCabe (2005) and Gentzkow (2007). However, we believe that our goal of a simple analysis is
best served with the model at hand.
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brand j is given by3
ui jm = αi(yi− p jm)+ x jβi+ξ j +∆ξ jm+ εi jm, (III.1)
wherein αi is the individual-specific marginal utility of income, βi is the K-dimensional vector of
individual-specific coefficients for product characteristics, ξ j is the (unobserved) mean contribution
to utility of brand j across all consumers in all markets, ∆ξ jm is the market-specific deviation from
ξ j, and εi jm is an individual-specific mean-zero stochastic deviation from ξ j. Given that αi and
βi determine how consumer i values brand j, it is natural to think that these coefficients will not
only depend on the product’s characteristics, but on the characteristics of the consumer as well.
To that end, suppose Di is a d-dimensional vector of demographic variables of consumer i. Since
a marketer (or an econometrician) cannot observe all characteristics of the consumer, let vi be a
K + 1-dimensional vector capturing the unobserved characteristics that interact with product char-
acteristics. Assuming that the unobserved characteristics vi are distributed multivariate normal and
are independent of Di,
(
αi
βi
)
=
(
α
β
)
+ΠDi+Σvi, vi ∼ N(0, IK+1), (III.2)
wherein Π is a (K+1)×d-dimensional matrix of coefficients on the interaction between consumer
demographic variables and product characteristics, Σ is a (K + 1)× (K + 1)-dimensional scaling
matrix of parameters determining the interaction of the unobserved consumer characteristics in vi
with the product’s characteristics, and α and β are the components of αi and βi that are identical
across consumers. Since α , β , and ξ j are invariant across all consumers, and ∆ξ jm is invariant across
all consumers in market m, the portion of consumer i’s valuation of brand j that depends upon the
characteristics of brand j can be broken into the sum of a mean valuation of the characteristics of
brand j across all consumers in the market and a heterogeneous (individual specific) component.
Defining x jm =
(p jm
x j
)
, a vector of product characteristics of brand j in market m, utility can be written
as follows:
3 Note that this indirect utility function is the result of a quasilinear utility function, wherein there are no wealth
effects (a reasonable assumption in the ready-to-eat cereal category). If this assumption is considered too strong for a
given product, utility can be constructed similarly to that of BLP (using Cobb-Douglas utility) so that wealth effects are
included in the model.
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ui jm = αiyi+δ jm+ x′jm(ΠDi+Σvi)+ εi jm, . (III.3)
where the income term αiyi will be shown to have no effect, δ jm = x jβ −α p jm + ξ j +∆ξ jm is the
mean utility, and the remainder of the expression is a mean-zero individual-specific heteroskedastic
deviation from the mean utility. Note that this specification yields two distinct sets of parameters,
those that enter utility in a linear fashion (α, β , ξ jm) and those that enter utility in a non-linear
way (Π, Σ); this difference in parameter types is exploited to simplify the estimation procedure in
Section 3.2.
Based on the utility for each brand j, consumers will choose to purchase one unit of the brand
that provides the greatest utility, or choose to purchase none of the brands. To facilitate the latter
possibility, it is assumed that there is an outside good with indirect utility given by ui0m. The
components of the utility for the outside good are not identified individually, and are estimated only
via the coefficient on the intercept term in the x j matrix.
III.3 Data and Estimation
III.3.1 The Data
Given the model described above, the following data is required to proceed with the estimation:
i) market shares and prices of a variety of cereal brands in several different markets, ii) characteris-
tics of each cereal brand in our sample, and iii) the distribution of relevant consumer characteristics
in each of the markets in our sample, in particular, a characteristic that serves as a proxy for con-
sumer health conscientiousness. The prices and market shares (as well as our instrumental variables
to handle price endogeneity) all come from the IRI marketing database (described below). Con-
sumer characteristics are constructed by combining data from the annual March Current Population
Survey with data from the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System. Finally, the cereal charac-
teristics were obtained by visiting grocery stores and looking at the labels of each cereal in our data
set.
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Table III.1: Cereal brands used in the analysis.
III.3.1.1 IRI Marketing Data
Information Resources, Inc. have recently made a large set of scanner data available for academic
research. These data cover 31 categories in 50 different markets from 2001 and 2006. Although the
full data set contains both grocery stores and drug stores, we limit our analysis to the market shares
of cereal sold in grocery stores. 4 The weekly store-level information is aggregated to the city-
quarter level, less store-quarters for which there are missing weeks as well as cities for which we do
not have sufficient consumer data. This leaves us with a total of 28 cities with observations for each
of 24 quarters. We define each city-quarter as a market, and thus we have 672 total markets in the
sample, with observations for each market-brand of the number of servings sold and revenue.5 Price
is the average price paid per serving (for each brand-market-quarter). We estimate demand across
the 23 universally available cereal brands listed in Table III.1, leaving us with a total of 15,456
observations.
The dependent variable in our structural model is market share. Thus, we need an operational
definition of market share that is a close approximation to the concept assumed in the underlying
demand model. This is accomplished by assuming that the total market size is some (maximum)
number of servings of cereal per person per day for each person in the market. In order to implement
this idea, an estimation of the number of people served by each store is required. In Nevo (2001),
the size of each market is estimated using the total population of the city (market) in question to
calculate the maximum number of cereal servings possible per quarter. As the IRI data is not a
4Our presumption is that cereal purchase patterns found in drug stores may not be representative of those found in the
rest of the market.
5Serving size was obtained from cereal packaging labels.
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census of all stores in the market, this estimation of market size will generally overestimate the
number of people served by the stores in the sample, and the degree of this overestimation may
vary substantially across markets. Moreover, the small fraction of the population of a given city that
actually shops at the included stores could also vary substantially over time. As a result, we chose
to estimate the market size based on the number of individuals “served” by each store, that is, the
total number of people in households wherein at least one individual from the household made at
least one purchase at the given store in the given quarter. Once the number of people served by each
store is estimated, we can then aggregate the number of people served by individual stores to get
the total number of people served by each market.
The basic idea behind our approach is to use household level data included in the IRI data set for
multiple stores in two US cities to estimate the conditional per capita consumption of 20 different
categories of goods purchased at grocery stores using local demographic information. We then use
the conditional averages and demographic data from the IRI scanner data markets to forecast per
capita consumption for each store in the full sample. This leaves us with a forecast of per capita
consumption for each of 20 product categories together with the observed total consumption in
those categories for every store/quarter in the dataset. Finally, we pick the number of people that
minimizes the sum of squared differences between actual volume sold and forecasted volume. This
gives us an estimate of number of people served in each store/quarter.
We begin by assuming that per capita consumption depends on price of a category (averaged
over the quarter and across all brands), and two demographic variables (age and income), and apply
what is essentially a representative agent approach.
Suppose that the quantity sold in category j, at store s, during quarter t is determined the fol-
lowing way:
Yjst = Nst ×g j(xst).
or on a per capita basis:
y jst ≡ Yjst/Nst = g j(xst).
Suppose now that the function g j(.) is such that the equations indexed by j above can be written
as in matrix form as
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ln(yst) = γ ln(pst)+Gxst .
where yst is a J×1 vector with the jth element equal to the volume sold per capita in category j at
store s during quarter t, γ is a J×J diagonal matrix of price elasticities6, pst is a vector of the log of
the average price per unit in each category, and where G is a matrix of coefficients that captures the
effect of demographic variables xst on the average quantity sold per quarter in each category. These
demographic variables are the log of income, the average age, and the percent of the population that
are children.
Prior to completing this stage of the estimation, the data are aggregated to the store-quarter
level. The volumes are averaged across people-weeks so that the unit of measure is physical units
per person per week. We then use the consumer panel data to estimate the system of equations
indicated above using seemingly unrelated regressions, resulting in parameter estimates γˆ and Gˆ.
Next, using the (aggregate level) IRI demographic data linked to the individual stores, together
with the parameters estimated in the procedure outlined above, we predict the per capita consump-
tion in each category via
ln(yˆ jst) = γˆ ln(p jst)+ Gˆxst
As Yjst is observed in the scanner data (and nst is the variable we wish to estimate), we assume
the model above can be applied to other stores7 yielding
Yjst = Nst yˆ jst + ε jst ,
where ε jst is the forecast error. Given this, we can use the generated regressor yˆ to run an OLS
regression using the J = 20 observations (for each combination of s and t in the data) and obtain an
estimate of Nst for each market.
There are, of course, potential problems in this estimation of market size. Forcing the regres-
6 For simplicity we assume that the cross-category price elasticities are zero, thus this matrix is diagonal.
7 The two US cities from which we estimate the model (Eau Clair, WI, and Springfield, IL) were specifically chosen
by IRI as cities that represent the “average” person in the US. While there are most certainly differences between the
populations of these cities and other cities in our dataset, we feel this should still provide a reasonable approximation of
the number of people served by a store in other cities.
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sion line through the origin removes the guarantee of mean zero errors in the OLS stage of the
regression, and could also result in endogeneity between the generated regressors (predicted per-
capita consumption) and the OLS errors. Figure III.1 provides a scatterplot of the OLS residuals
versus the predicted total sales volumes for 10 randomly-selected stores. As expected, given that
the regression line passes through the origin and that predicted total volumes must be positive, the
residuals for very small predicted total sales volumes tend to be positive. However, Figure III.1
still provides evidence that the errors are mean zero away from the origin. The lack of endogeneity
between the explanatory variable and the errors in the OLS stage (also potentially created by the
lack of a constant term) can be seen in Figure III.2, plotting the predicted per-capita consumption
for each category against the observed total volumes for 10 randomly selected stores. This graph
provides evidence that the OLS errors are still orthogonal to the generated regressors, and that the
estimation technique leaving the constant out of the regression is valid. Though it is clear from Fig-
ure III.1 that the residuals for the individual categories can be quite large relative to the predicted
total volumes, it should be noted that the estimates of the number of people served by each store
are consistent across quarters, while also tracking well with the observed total volumes of the cate-
gories for stores that are decreasing in total sales volumes (and subsequently the number of people
the store serves). Moreover, an in-sample pseudo R-squared calculation using the IRI household
panel data (wherein we have the true value of N jst) yields a value of 94%, indicating that the above
method does have significant explanatory power for predicting the number of people served by a
given store. We contend that this procedure provides a much better picture of the size of the market
than simply setting the number of people served by each market equal to the population of the city.
The final step in estimating market size is to define the maximum number of servings of ce-
real per person per quarter. Nevo (2001) makes the assumption that each individual consumes a
maximum of one serving per day, though the data shows that some people, on average, consume
significantly more than one serving of cereal per day. Analysis of the IRI Household Panel Data,
reflected in Figure III.3, indicates that the median household consumes 5.3 servings of cereal per
person per week and 10% of households consume more than 7 servings per person per week (based
on a serving size of 28 mg). Though Nevo’s estimation of market size is unlikely to be affected
by this (given that the population of a city is a significant over-estimate of the people who enter
the stores in the data set), to insure an accurate representation of the market (and to assure that the
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Figure III.1: Residuals versus fitted values.
Figure III.2: Predicted per-capita consumption versus total volume.
67
Figure III.3: Kernel density estimate of consumed weekly servings per person.
outside share is nonnegative) we take the highest per capita total cereal consumption found in the
data set and use that as the basis for market size computation (slightly less than 3 servings per day).
Given this, we can calculate the market size for each individual store (and for each market, which is
the sum across all stores in a city/quarter).
III.3.1.2 Consumer Data
We simulate draws from the population of consumers using the March Current Population Survey
for the years corresponding to the cereal market share data. For our primary estimates, we sample
(with replacement) 40 individuals from the CPS for each market-year. The consumer variables we
consider are income (total household income divided by the number of individuals in the house),
income squared, age, and the dummy variable child, set equal to one if the individual is 16 years old
or younger. Income is deflated by the CPI-U specific to that market. For the unobservable consumer
characteristics, we simulate draws from an iid standard normal distribution.
Our proxy variable for health conscientiousness comes from data collected by the CDC via
the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System (BRFSS). This annual phone survey is conducted
across the United States and includes a variety of demographic information including questions
about tobacco use, the consumption of fruits and vegetables, amount of physical exercise, etc. Fig-
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Figure III.4: Annual BRFSS smoking rates for each market
ure III.4 shows the smoking rates for the annual samples of the BRFSS for each of the 28 markets in
our data, demonstrating the relative consistency of the survey data (and the slow decline of smoking
over time). The problem, however, is that this information is limited to the adult that answers the
phone, and does not include information about others in the household. In order to estimate the full
structural model presented here, it is necessary to have a distribution of consumer characteristics
(including that of children), from which to simulate the market shares. Thus, the limitations of
the BRFSS prevent us from using this data alone. In order to construct a distribution of consumer
characteristics, we need to predict tobacco use in the CPS dataset using the BRFSS data set.
A simple approach would be to use the BRFSS survey data to predict smoking behavior across
all adults in the CPS data set. However, this would give no proxy variable for the health conscien-
tiousness of children. This could be handled by assigning a dummy variable that takes the value 1
if an adult within the household smokes. However, note that tobacco use is very likely correlated
within households, and thus predicting smoking across all adults across a market will result in an
upward bias in the number of households with an adult smoker.
To facilitate the construction of a variable that reflects some measure of tobacco use across a
market using the BRFSS data, we first estimate a probit model to predict the probability of smoking
by income, age, education level, and whether or not there are children in the home (the demographic
variables included in the BRFSS). After this, we draw a random adult from each household in the
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Table III.2: Number of observations for each income/education level
CPS data set, and using the results of the aforementioned probit model we forecast the probability
that each randomly selected person smokes. These probabilities are then used in a single Bernoulli
trial for each randomly selected (adult) individual from each household to determine a prediction of
whether or not the individual smokes or does not smoke. The resulting value of the dummy variable
is then extended to each individual in the household. It is important to note that since we are using
many years worth of the BRFSS data to estimate the probit, the parameter estimates for the probit
model are constant for each city (market) across all quarters in the dataset.
Though psuedo R-squared calculations for the probit model in each individual market yield very
low numbers (between 7% and 10%), these results are not surprising given the many contributing
factors to individual smoking behavior (beyond age, income and education level). Moreover, if these
demographic variables easily explained smoking behavior, then these same demographics would be
able to control for health conscientiousness (given our assumption that smoking is a good proxy
for health conscientiousness), and so the low explanatory power of these variables in predicting
smoking behavior suggests the potential value of information about smoking behavior in the esti-
mation of demand. On the other hand, our technique does do well in aggregate. Given income and
education levels, Table III.2 provides the total number of observations for each income/education
combination, while Table III.3 provides the difference between the aggregate predicted rates and
the true aggregate rates from the BRFSS. As shown by these results, the model provides predictions
that track well with aggregate smoking rates for income/education blocks with many observations.
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Table III.3: Difference between predicted and actual smoking rates by income/educaton level.
Therefore, as the individual dummy variable will reflect both the explained variation in the city-level
probit model and the across-city variation in smoking rates, we contend that this variable is a rea-
sonable proxy for health conscientiousness (provided that health conscientiousness is significantly
correlated across individuals within a household).
III.3.1.3 Instruments
We instrument prices with an average of that brand’s price in all other markets in the region for each
of 24 quarters. 8 For example, the price of Cheerios in Chicago during Q1 in 2001 is instrumented
by the average price of Cheerios in the Midwest excluding Chicago for each of the 24 quarters in
the data set. Note that these instruments should be correlated with market-level unobservables that
effect endogenous prices, and thus are reasonable instruments.
III.3.2 Estimation
Given that each consumer is assumed to purchase a single unit of one brand, or purchase nothing
at all, we can define the set of variables for which a consumer will choose to purchase good j; if x·m
is the matrix of characteristics, p·m is the vector of prices, and δ·m is the vector of mean utilities (the
same for all consumers in the market), for all brands in market m, this set is:
8The IRI markets are assigned to one of four census regions: West, Midwest, South, or Northeast.
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C jm(x·,m, p·,m,δ·,m;Π,Σ) = {(Di,vi,εi jm)|uikm ≤ ui jm∀k 6= j}.
Assuming that Di has a known distribution F(D), εi jm has distribution F(ε), and the distribution
of vi is F(v), we can use the assumed independence of these variables to derive the market share for
brand j in market m (assuming that consumers are never indifferent between products):
s jm =
∫
C jm
dF(D)dF(v)dF(ε). (III.4)
As previously mentioned, F(v) is a multivariate normal distribution, and we assume that the
values for εi jm are i.i.d. and that F(ε) is a type 1 extreme value distribution. As we “observe” the
market share of each brand in our data set, the above market share equation, which is dependent
upon the values of the parameters, suggests a comparison between the observed market shares and
those predicted via the consumer model. To facilitate easier calculation of s jm, it could be assumed
that consumers are identical save for the value of εi jm, and thus the values of all parameters that enter
utility non-linearly are zero, αi = α , βi = β , and the only remaining error is the additively separable
error εi jm. Though restrictive, this assumption results in the model reducing to the multinomial logit
model, in which case equation (III.4) becomes
s jm =
exp(x jmβ −α p jm+ξ jm)
1+∑r=Jmr=1 exp(xrmβ −α prm+ξrm)
,
where income drops out due to its presence in the utility of all brands. Though computationally
easy to work with, the multinomial logit model results in unreasonable substitution patterns and
downward biased own-price elasticities as discussed in the literature review of this paper. For a
basis of comparison we do report results for the simplified (multinomial logit) model, but we then
estimate the full model using the method described in Section 2. To begin, we construct a set of
consumers for each market, complete with the vector of demographics Di, by randomly selecting a
fixed number (ncons) of “consumers” from the CPS data discussed in Section 3.1. Following Nevo
(2001) and BLP, we use this set of consumers to approximate equation (III.4) using the smooth
estimator
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s jm ≈ 1ncons
ncons
∑
i=1
exp(δ jm+ x′jm(ΠDi+Σvi))
1+∑r=Jmr=1 exp(δrm+ x′rm(ΠDi+Σvi))
. (III.5)
As this estimation of market shares is a function of the parameters, we could move forward with
the estimation by simply trying to minimize the difference between observed shares from the data
and the estimated shares; however, there are two problems with this approach. First, the number of
parameters over which the minimization occurs would be very costly in the computational sense.9
Second, and more importantly, price in this model is endogenously chosen by the firm, and thus
may be chosen in response to variables remaining in the modeled error (in this case the difference
between the observed shares and the shares given by equation (III.5)). Thus it is reasonable to
assume that price is correlated with the error term, and we are left with an endogeneity problem.
Both of these issues are resolved by applying the method put forth by BLP.
To implement this approach using the addition of brand dummy variables as in Nevo (2001),
note that Berry (1994) defines the structural error term to be the effect on utility of the unobserved
product characteristics, or ξ j +∆ξ jm. As brand dummy variables will capture all effects of unob-
served product characteristics that are identical across consumers (ξ j), this implies that the only
remaining structural error10 in the model is due to ∆ξ jm. Recall that δ jm = x jβ −α p j +ξ j +∆ξ jm,
and thus ∆ξ jm = δi jm−(x jβ−α p j+ξ j). Since product characteristics for a given brand are constant
across all markets in the data set, brand dummy variables will also capture the effect of observed
product characteristics (save for price), thus ∆ξ jm = δ jm− (B j−α p j), where B j denotes the value
of coefficient on the brand dummy variable for brand j. Therefore, ∆ξ jm can be written as a function
of the model’s parameters (as δ jm is a function of these parameters). Denoting the parameters as θ ,
and using a set of instruments for each brand/market, Z jm, such that E[Z′jm ·∆ξ jm(θ ∗)] = 0 for all j
and all m, where θ ∗ denotes the structural error at the true parameter values, we can then construct
a GMM estimator as follows:11
9The MPEC method put forth in Dube´, et al. (2012) allows direct maximization using a different objective subject
to the “constraints” given by the equality of observed versus simulated shares and moment conditions. We have not yet
implemented this approach.
10Note that ε is not considered as part of the structural error as the i.i.d. assumption on ε would imply this to be
superfluous in the moment condition expression.
11Note that our instruments, the average price of a brand over the region less the price within the given market, should
be correlated with any market-level shocks to the price that would otherwise be in the error term. Thus the identification
assumption is reasonable.
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θˆ = argmin
θ
ξ (θ)′Zφ−1Z′ξ (θ), (III.6)
wherein φ−1 is a weighting matrix consisting of a consistent estimator of E[Z′ξξ ′Z].
Now consider δ jm, the mean utility for brand j in market m, required to calculate the value of
the GMM objective. To solve for the value of δ jm for each brand in each market we numerically
invert the corresponding shares via the contraction mapping
δ a+1·m = δ
a
·m− ln(S·m)− ln(s·m), (III.7)
for m = 1, ...,M, a = 1,2, ..., and wherein S·m denotes the observed shares. This equation is iterated
until ||δ a+1·m −δ a·m|| is below a predetermined tolerance level, yielding an estimate for the vector δ·m
for each market. As a result, for any given value for the model parameters, δ·m can be estimated as
a function of those parameters. Also note that since α and B j enter the GMM objective in a linear
fashion, the FOC’s w.r.t. these parameters allow us to solve for the linear parameters in terms of the
nonlinear parameters.12 Therefore, since the only parameters required to estimate δ·m for all m are
those that enter consumer utility in a non-linear fashion (that is, α , β , and B, where B is the vector
of B j’s, are not required in order to get an estimate for mean utility), once the value of δ·m has been
estimated for all markets, this estimate can be used to get an estimate for the parameters α and B.
The estimates for δ·m, α , and B can then be used to calculate the value of the GMM objective.
To summarize, for a given set of starting values for the nonlinear parameters Π and Σ, we can
then estimate δ·m using the aforementioned contraction mapping. With the estimate of δ·m we can
estimate the values of α and B, and with all of these estimates we can calculate the value of the
GMM objective given by equation (III.6). We then search over values of Π and Σ to minimize this
objective, which is done using the optimization program Knitro with an analytical gradient.
There are now three details left to discuss. First, we must estimate E[Z′ξξ ′Z]. We follow Nevo’s
primary suggestion by starting with φˆ = Z′Z, searching for a “first-stage” estimate of the parameters,
θˆ1, and then using φˆ = ∑Mm=1∑
Jm
j=1(∆ξ jm(θˆ1)
2Z′jmZ jm to find a (re-weighted) second-stage estimate
θˆ2. Second, the variance covariance matrix for the estimates above is calculated, correcting for
12Using matrix calculus, with XB denoting a matrix of prices and brand dummy variables, it can be shown that [αB·]′ =
(X ′LZΦ−1Z′XL)−1X ′LZΦ−1Z′δ−−.
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the estimation error due to the contraction mapping. Finally, once an estimate of α , B·, Π, and Σ
is found, we follow Nevo in exploiting the fact that the brand dummy variable coefficients B j are
composed of the mean effects of the observed product characteristics x jβ and the mean effects of the
unobserved product characteristics ξ j so that B j = x jβ +ξ j. Thus by assuming that the conditional
expectation of ξ j given the observed product characteristics is zero (E[ξ |x j] = 0), and defining VB
to be the variance covariance matrix of the Bˆ′js, generalized least squares can be used to obtain
βˆ = (X ′V−1B X)
−1X ′V−1B B,
wherein X = [x1 x2 ... xJ] is the matrix of product characteristics of all brands in the sample (i.e. the
observations are the brands), and ξ· = B−X βˆ .
III.4 Results
As a first step in investigating the interaction of health conscientiousness and product charac-
teristics, we estimate the model as a multinomial logit as described in Section 3.2. This reduces
the problem to a regression of ln(S jm)− ln(S0m) (wherein S0m is the share of the outside good in
market m) on price and product characteristics, with added interactions of product characteristics
and consumer variables that are averaged over markets. These regressions are repeated for various
combinations of these variables using two stage least squares regressions with the aforementioned
price instruments, together with dummy variables for each brand and quarter. The final regression
(vi) also includes a dummy variable for each market. The results of these regressions can be found
in Table III.4, with heteroskedastically robust standard errors reported in parentheses. Note that
throughout these results there is a positive and significant coefficient on the interaction of the to-
bacco proxy variable and sugar content, while the interactions of this proxy with fat content and
fiber content are consistently insignificant. Though these regressions do support the notion that a
proxy variable for consumer health conscientiousness is important in the estimation of demand, we
must be careful in the interpretation of what this means given the aggregated (city-level) structure
of this simplified model. For example, in regression (v) the coefficient on the interaction of the
proportion of children in a market with the fiber content of a product is positive and significant
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(a seemingly counter-intuitive result). These results demonstrate the difficulty in estimating such
effects using city-level consumer charactersitics, as the proportion of children is highly correlated
with household size and age, and the resulting coefficient on this interaction could be explained
via non-linearity of demand for fiber with respect to age combined with other variables “soaking
up” the intuitive effects of the proportion of children in a city. While these logit results do provide
evidence of the potential value of our smoking dummy variable in the estimation of demand, they
also provide strong motivation for continuing to the full model, wherein the included consumer
heterogeneity allows these variables to differ across consumers in the same market.
The next step is to estimate the full random-coefficients logit model using the smoking proxy
variable. This was performed with a simulation draw of 40 consumers, resulting in the estimates
presented in Table III.5 below,13 where the first column presents the minimum-distance estimates,
the second column is the estimates of the deviations from these values due to the unobserved con-
sumer characteristics, and the final five columns are estimates of the coefficients on the interaction
terms (with standard errors in parentheses).
The model results in estimates of price coefficients (and others) that are in line with previous
results, including a negative coefficient on the interaction of child and fiber. While the coefficient
on the interaction of tobacco and sugar is nearly, but not quite significant at the 10% level, it does
suggest that tobacco use may be linked with increased demand for sugary cereals (especially in leu
of the previously provided multinomial logit results). Moreover, the coefficients on the interaction
terms of the smoking dummy and the other health-related product characteristics are also quite close
to being significant at the 10% level, and in-line with what a researcher might intuitively expect.14
Given these results with our simulated explanatory variables, it stands to reason that further anal-
ysis with survey data and/or panel data containing stated smoking behavior could sharpen these
results significantly. In any case, marketers and economists should take note that measures of health
conscientiousness could have significant interactions with health-related product characteristics in
the determination of demand, and that the collection of these (possibly very relevant) consumer
characteristics should be considered.
13The simulation was run 10 times for pseudo-random starting values generated from a normal distribution with mean
zero and standard deviation 25, all of which converged to the results presented here. The (tight) inner loop tolerance for
the contraction mapping was 10−14.
14Higher fat content is typically associated with cereals containing nuts, and thus the negative coefficient on fat would
indicate that people who smoke are less likely to purchase such cereals.
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Table III.4: Multinomial logit results.
VARIABLES (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi)
Price -4.755*** -5.026*** -4.709*** -4.994*** -4.973*** -6.308***
(0.212) (0.212) (0.212) (0.212) (0.212) (0.212)
Log of Median Income 0.755*** 0.663*** 0.819*** 0.707*** 0.736*** -1.069
(0.0306) (0.0308) (0.0639) (0.0639) (0.0664) (1.107)
Log of Median Age -1.405*** -1.148*** -1.409*** -1.150*** -1.209*** -3.427
(0.117) (0.116) (0.116) (0.116) (0.274) (2.664)
Median HH Size 0.175*** 0.153*** 0.204*** 0.174*** 0.189*** -0.119
(0.00904) (0.00907) (0.0183) (0.0183) (0.0206) (0.830)
Prop of Children -6.991*** -6.453*** -6.987*** -6.451*** -7.248*** -10.83
(0.263) (0.260) (0.263) (0.260) (0.607) (6.973)
Sugar Content 0.00101 -0.000604 -0.0331*** -0.0563*** 0.125 -0.0649***
(0.00230) (0.00228) (0.00744) (0.00855) (0.101) (0.00582)
Fiber Content 0.300*** 0.298*** 0.374*** 0.374*** -0.0556 0.367***
(0.0172) (0.0170) (0.0231) (0.0248) (0.220) (0.0166)
Fat Content 4.350*** 4.254*** 4.477*** 4.413*** 3.914*** 3.943***
(0.212) (0.210) (0.214) (0.215) (0.691) (0.151)
Tobacco Use - -1.772*** - -2.364*** -2.334*** -9.012***
(0.0945) (0.213) (0.215) (2.403)
Tobacco x Sugar - - - 0.101*** 0.111*** 0.106***
(0.0201) (0.0202) (0.0145)
Tobacco x Fiber - - - -0.00845 -0.0364 -0.0211
(0.0453) (0.0455) (0.0323)
Tobacco x Fat - - - -0.166 -0.189 -0.135
(0.128) (0.130) (0.0848)
Age x Sugar - - - - -0.0351 -
(0.0249)
Age x Fiber - - - - 0.0763 -
(0.0542)
Age x Fat - - - - 0.106 -
(0.163)
Income x Sugar - - -0.0476*** -0.0437*** -0.0332*** -0.0431***
(0.00597) (0.00599) (0.00641) (0.00433)
Income x Fiber - - 0.0307** 0.0295** 0.000164 0.0250**
(0.0135) (0.0136) (0.0145) (0.00973)
Income x Fat - - 0.221*** 0.215*** 0.191*** 0.218***
(0.0355) (0.0353) (0.0383) (0.0260)
Children x Sugar - - - - -0.279*** -
(0.0567)
Chidren X Fiber - - - - 0.800*** -
(0.125)
Children x Fat - - - - 0.616* -
(0.361)
HH Size X Sugar - - 0.00211 -0.0168*** 0.00764*** 0.00343***
(0.00162) (0.00361) (0.00189) (0.00109)
HH Size x Fiber - - -0.0167*** -0.0168*** -0.0304*** -0.0165***
(0.00359) (0.00361) (0.00428) (0.00241)
HH Size X Fat - - 0.00439 0.00200 -0.00566 0.000947
(0.0102) (0.0102) (0.0119) (0.00647)
Constant -4.479*** -4.925*** -4.563*** -4.875*** -4.527*** 6.511
(0.577) (0.575) (0.578) (0.578) (1.160) (8.365)
Observations 15,456 15,456 15,456 15,456 15,456 15,456
1st stage R-Sq 0.9499 0.9449 0.9449 0.945 0.945 0.9561
1st stage F-Test 382.27 380.05 381.691 378.801 380.052 232.745
R-Sq 0.759 0.765 0.761 0.767 0.768 0.889
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table III.5: Results of the full model.
III.5 Conclusion
The goal of this paper is to investigate whether or not the interactions of a proxy variable for
consumer health conscientiousness and easily-observed health-related quantitative product charac-
teristics are useful in the estimation of demand for products where healthiness may be a concern
to some consumers. We have shown that there is some evidence to suggest that smoking behavior,
as a proxy for health conscientiousness, may be an important explanatory variable in the determi-
nation of demand for health-related product characteristics of ready-to-eat cereals. Replication of
the above estimation procedures using different proxy variables and/or different food categories, or
using a true household panel complete with stated smoking behavior, may provide more evidence
for the importance of considering consumer health conscientiousness in the estimation of demand.
These results may not only provide an impetus to pursue the question with more complex models,
they may also provide guidance in how such models could and/or should be constructed. The use of
health rankings of products, surveys of consumer perceptions about products, and other such data
sources could potentially be justified by our analysis.
It should also be noted that while we have chosen to use the random coefficients logit with the
BLP-style contraction mapping to analyze our aggregate-level dataset, there are alternatives to this
method. The MPEC method put forth in Dube´, Fox, and Su (2012) uses the properties of sparse
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matrices to directly minimize the objective using the share equation as an extra constraint, and the
SQUAREM technique suggested by Reynarts, Varadhan, and Nash (2012) is also an alternative to
the BLP-stlye contraction mapping. Finally, the Bayesian technique presented in Jiang, et al. (2009)
provides an additional avenue with which aggregate level data could be used to estimate the model
of this paper. Though replication of the above results should be possible with the above methods, we
believe the next step in the analysis is to collect individual-level data rather then rely on (inherently
noisy) aggregate-level estimation techniques.
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CHAPTER IV
ESTIMATING THE COMPONENTS OF HOUSEHOLD DEMAND USING REVEALED
PREFERENCE DATA
IV.1 Introduction
One of the primary goals of marketing is to determine how a consumer base feels about the
brands and/or relevant product characteristics in a product category. The ability to answer such
questions is complicated by the significant amount of consumer heterogeneity present within most
markets, which must be handled in such a way as to draw inference about “average” consumer
preferences while still allowing for the recovery of actionable information about how preferences
differ across the consumer base. This last point is especially important given the increasing amount
of data available to marketing practitioners about consumer characteristics and purchase history,
and the ever-improving ability to reach individual consumers with targeted marketing.
An often overlooked problem in modeling consumer preferences originates from the form of
a common type of dataset, the household-level panel. It is widely accepted that the decisions of
a household are affected by the interactions of the individuals within the household, and that a
single set of preferences is insufficient to control for the underlying amalgamation of the (possi-
bly) several sets of preferences that leads to observed purchasing behavior. Though there are many
methods for handling heterogeneity across households (e.g. Random coefficients models, finite
mixture models, and continuous mixture models1), almost every model in the extant literature on
the estimation of consumer preferences either treats the household as having a single set of prefer-
ences or ignores households altogether and (essentially) assumes that individuals act independently.
These approaches are somewhat defensible in much of the econometrics literature, as the parame-
ters yielding individual consumer preferences are typically considered nuisance parameters in the
estimation of the aggregate-level parameters used in market analysis and/or policy. However, given
the aforementioned goal, such models are inadequate for the purposes of marketing.
1 For a thorough discussion of the model available for handling heterogeneity across households, and their applicabil-
ity to marketing problems, see Allenby and Rossi (1998).
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In contrast, this paper presents a hierarchical Bayesian finite mixture model that allows the indi-
vidual purchases in a household panel to be segmented into similar groups. The model estimates the
parameters of the distribution of each segment as well as the probabilities that a given household’s
purchases belong to each segment, yielding valuable information about the “important” segments
within a household demographic. Thus, the model presented in this paper is novel in that it retrieves
both aggregate-level preferences and the individual-level information useful for targeted marketing,
while also allowing for household purchases to be the result of multiple sets of preferences. Ad-
ditionally, the Markov chain Monte Carlo (henceforth MCMC) algorithm for estimating the model
may be run in parallel across households, allowing for application to the large datasets that are in-
creasingly common in practice. For the purposes of demonstrating the function of the algorithm, the
model is applied to a simulated household panel dataset, with convergence providing good results
in the estimation of the true parameters used in the generation of the data.
IV.1.1 Outline
Section 2 of this paper describes the consumer demand model. Section 3 provides a description
of the simulated data on which the model is applied. Section 4 demonstrates the potential problems
with ignoring within-household heterogeneity. Section 5 provides the algorithm for the MCMC
routine. Section 6 presents the results of the model when applied to the simulated dataset and
discusses application to real household panel data. Section 7 concludes the paper.
IV.1.2 Related Literature
One potential method for handling the within-household heterogeneity discussed above is the
technique found in Nevo (2001), applying the popular model of Berry et al. (1995) to household-
level scanner data from U.S. grocery stores. Nevo’s model specifies the utility for individuals as a
function of the interactions between product characteristics and the characteristics of the individual
(including age). However, as the data used in the Nevo’s analysis is limited to aggregate-level
shares of each brand (i.e. purchases are not linked to a specific person or household), estimation
is achieved through simulation of the city-level markets. This is accomplished by taking a random
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sample of individuals from the current population survey (census data) of the cities in question and
using the given values of the utility parameters to calculate the simulated shares of each brand in
each market. Estimation of the parameters proceeds via a method for selecting the parameter values
that minimize the distance between the observed shares and the simulated shares in each market.
While useful in many applications, this method has several drawbacks that make it unsuitable for
handling the problem highlighted here. First, Nevo’s model essentially assumes that each individual
makes their own purchases independently, ignoring the interactions between individuals in each
household that result in the observed shares. Though my model does not explicitly estimate these
interactions, any such effects will be picked up in the simulation of the household-level preference
distributions. Second, Nevo’s method is designed for aggregate-level data, and while household-
level purchase data could be aggregated to create such a dataset, this results in the loss of potentially
useful information (such as the vector of prices faced by individual households). Obviously, this
loss of information can result in poor estimation of the individual vs. product interaction parameters.
While these are nuisance parameters in Nevo’s analysis, the fact that these parameters are the the
unique points of interest to marketers make this technique unsuitable for the problem at hand.
Another method that could be used to address the problem at hand is given in Dube´ (2004). In
this paper, Dube´ develops a model of household demand that is applied to household-level puchase
data within the carbonated soft-drinks category. In order to handle the issue of multiple discrete-
ness (i.e. multiple brands being purchased for a single household on a given shopping trip), Dube´
defines the concept of a consumption occasion. Each purchase made by the household is assumed
to maximize the utility for a specific consumption occasion, and the preferences for each product at
a specific occasion are drawn from a household-specific distribution (a distribution of heterogeneity
within each household’s purchases). This distribution allows each household’s set of purchases to
be split over multiple preference draws (from the aforementioned distribution), and the estimated
parameters of the this distribution can then be used to explain the observed multiple discreteness
in the soft drink data. While my model adopts the notion of each purchase being linked to a “con-
sumption occasion,” a reasonable approach to handling variety-seeking in a household panel, there
is an important flaw in Dube`’s model with respect to the goal of this paper.
While Dube´ does explicitly model within-household heterogeneity, the model assumes the dis-
tribution of the vector of utilities for a given household is distributed multivariate normal with a
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diagonal variance-covariance matrix. As a result, the unimodal structure of these distributions pre-
vents the model from picking up differences in household preferences that are multi-modal. To see
this, consider an example in the ice cream category in which there are two types of occasions for
which a household purchases, one in which the adults in the household consume the ice cream and
strongly prefer brand a over brand b, and another where children are the consumers and strongly pre-
fer brand b over brand a. Modeling the distribution of this household’s utilities over the two products
with a bivariate normal distribution will provide poor estimates of the household’s true preferences,
as the unimodal distribution will (incorrectly) force the “average” of these preferences to be a more
likely draw than either of the true sets of preferences associated with observed purchases. This
problem is made worse by the use of a diagonal variance-covariance matrix in the within-household
heterogeneity distribution, resulting in parameter estimates that yield no information about how the
utility of brand a covaries with the utility of brand b. In this situation, Dube´’s model will provide the
marketer little to no evidence of the underlying preferences of such households, a serious problem
when such preferences are prevalent in the category.
Rather than using a single distribution to model within-household heterogeneity, the model
presented here applies what is known as a finite mixture model. In such models, the preferences
of an individual (yielding the vector of probabilities of choosing any one product) are assumed
to be described by one of finitely many “mixing distributions.” For the previous example, one
could imagine a model of the preferences over ice-cream flavors where adults are modeled with one
distribution and children are modeled with another. The usefulness of such models comes from the
ability to estimate the parameters of each of the mixing distributions without knowing, ex-ante, the
distribution from which the preferences of each individual arise. One method for evaluating such
models, known as the latent class model (henceforth LCM), is presented in Kamakura and Russell
(1989). As in McFadden (1974), Kamakura and Russel specify an individual’s utility to be a (linear)
function of product characteristics with a random (Type I extreme value) error component, but
with the parameters in the utility function of each consumer coming from one of finitely many
“segments.” It is assumed that the probability of each household belonging to a given segment
is fixed, and estimation of the model proceeds via maximum likelihood using the likelihood of
the observed purchase histories of the individuals. While Kamakura and Russell’s model is an
interesting, and very popular, method for segmenting a sample of households into homogeneous
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groups, it should be noted that this method alone does not address the aforementioned problem
of within-household heterogeneity. The LCM assigns each household to a single segment, and
therefore treats each household as having a single set of preferences.
The paper that is closest in structure to what is present in my model is that of Varki and Chintagunta
(2004), wherein an LCM is augmented by the possibility that the purchases of some proportion of
households are the result of a mixture of segments; that is, while some percentage of households
are assigned to a single segment, the purchases of the rest of the households are a mixture wherein
each purchase of the household results from the preferences of an individual segment. Varki and
Chintangunta’s choice model therefore allows for some degree of within-household segmentation
to be picked up in the estimation, including the percentage of households in which purchases are
the result of a mixture of segments and the parameters of the Dirichlet distribution that determines
the probabilities of membership to each segment. Though their model is a step in right direction,
there are still important reasons that Varki and Chintagunta’s model does not adequately solve the
problem. First, their model would have significant problems handling large datasets in which house-
holds purchase a wide variety of brands. This is because (as in most LCMs) the preferences for each
individual at each choice occasion are a single draw from a fixed distribution that is the same for
all members of the segment. As a result, if there is a significant number of households purchasing
several brands from a large set of possible brands, the distribution of product purchases assigned to
each segment for each household must reflect the fixed preferences of that segment. While this is
not an issue if the number of segments is large relative to the number of brands being considered,
or in cases where only a single brand is purchased fairly consistently (as in Varki and Chinatgunta’s
datasets of observed peanut butter and ketchup purchases), their model is ill-suited for datasets such
as ready-to-eat cereal and soft-drinks.
Another important drawback of Varki and Chintagunta’s approach is the treatment of the latent
probability that a single purchase belongs to a given segment (for those households with purchases
reflecting a mixture of segments). Households with different demographic characteristics will differ
substantially with respect to the segments that combine to yield their observed purchases. For
example, a household consisting of a young unmarried male will not likely have similar probabilities
of assignment across segments as a family with several children. In Varki and Chintagunta’s model,
these probabilities are all drawn from the same distribution for all households (a single Dirichlet
84
distribution). While this Dirichlet distribution will be able to pick up some heterogeneity in the
assignment probabilities across households, the resulting parameters estimates will provide little
to no information about how these households vary across the segments. That is, if the Dirichlet
parameters are relatively small, as to allow for vastly differing probability vectors across households,
the resulting distribution will be very “flat” and will yield little information about the probability
of segment membership. However, if the estimated Dirichlet parameters are large enough to be
somewhat informative about segment membership they will severely restrict the ability of the model
to pick up heterogeneity in the assignment probabilities across household types, leading to dubious
results.
In defense of Varki and Chintagunta’s analysis, this is not likely an issue in the peanut butter
and ketchup categories to which they apply their model, as preferences may not vary as widely
across household types. Again, however, Varki and Chintagunta’s model is unsuitable for cate-
gories such as ready-to-eat cereal and soft drinks, wherein the assignment to different segments
will differ substantially across household types. A final problem with their model is that the esti-
mation proceeds by integrating over the aforementioned Dirichlet density (via simulated maximum
likelihood). Though the results include an estimated aggregate probability vector of all purchases
belonging to a given segment, the mixture probabilities of households are not individually identi-
fied. Therefore, though some households are modeled as a mixture across the segments, there is
little information about segment membership of these households recovered in the estimation. So
Varki and Chintagunta’s model does not provide much in the way of useful information for targeted
marketing.
By comparison, the model presented in this paper uses Bayesian techniques to fit a finite
mixture choice model, a technique presented in Diebolt and Robert (1994). I adapt the model of
Allenby et al. (1998), a variant of Diebolt and Robert’s model that (like Diebolt and Robert’s and
the typical LCM) assigns each household to a single segment to allow the individual choices of each
household to be the result of a mixture of segments (defined as “consumption occasion types).” This
allows my model to easily handle multiple discreteness/variety-seeking in complex markets such
as ready-to-eat cereal and soft drinks. Moreover, unlike the models above, my model allows the
probability vector of choice assignments to be drawn from a different Dirichlet distribution for
each pre-specified household demographic. The benefit of applying this method over the traditional
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LCM or hierarchical Bayesian mixture model is that within-household heterogeneity is modeled in
such a way as to estimate the distribution of preferences within each consumption occasion type,
while providing useful information about the how the choices of specific household (demographic)
types are distributed across the consumption occasion types. As a result, the model provides both
aggregate-level information about preferences and the more granular information about individual
households that is valuable in modern marketing, all while being logically and computationally
suitable for larger household panel datasets.
IV.2 The Model
The assumptions about household behavior used to derive the model are straightforward. As
previously mentioned, I follow Dube´ (2004) in using the notion of a “consumption occasion.” A
consumption occasion, the specific point at which the product is consumed, can differ greatly across
individuals, or even across the same individual using a product for different purposes. For example,
ready-to-eat cereal can be consumed for breakfast or for a late-afternoon snack, with preferences
quite possibly being very different between these occasion types, even for the same individual.
Thus, a structure built upon the idea of a consumption occasion can be very flexible in handling
heterogeneity in purchase decisions, both across individuals and within the purchases of a single
individual. To link consumption occasions to the observed purchase choices of a household within
the context of a discrete choice model, it is assumed that each observed choice results from the
maximization of the household’s utility for a specific consumption occasion, so that each choice
corresponds to a single consumption occasion, and viceversa. These consumption occasions are
then assumed to belong to one of finitely many consumption occasion types, with the type of the
consumption occasion determining the preferences for the specific choice. These consumption oc-
casion types have similar, but not identical, preferences across households, and the probability that
a choice belongs to any one of the consumption occasion types is fixed for each individual house-
hold. Unlike the model of Varki and Chintagunta, each household’s vector of probabilities is not
restricted to be drawn from the same distribution, but these probability vectors are assumed to be
similar across demographically similar households. The choice model used to describe this structure
is then constructed using the following notation:
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i) The product is denoted by j ∈ {1,2, ...,J}
ii) The household is denoted by h ∈ {1,2, ...,H}
iii) The household demographic type is denoted by τ ∈ {1,2, ...,ϒ}
iv) The consumption occasion is denoted by t ∈ {1,2, ..,T}
v) The consumption occasion type is denoted by k ∈ {1,2, ...,K}
Given this, the utility for household h for a unit of product j at a consumption occasion of type k is
given by
Uhk = γhk j + εhk jt
where γhk j is the mean utility of household h for product type j at consumption occasions of type k,
and εhk jt is a stochastic deviation from that mean utility that is different for each single consumption
occasion of type k of the household. As all households are assumed to have similar, but not identical,
preferences for a given consumption occasion type, the γhk j for each consumption occasion type of
household h is a function of product characteristics defined as
γh jk = xh jβk +ξh jk
where xh j is a household-specific row vector of product characteristics, βk is a column vector of
coefficients that are the same across all households at consumption occasions of type k, and ξh jk
is household-product specific error for that occasion type. Thus, the term xh jβk is the mean utility
(given the value of the product characteristics) across all households at consumption occasions of
type k and ξh jk is the deviation from that mean utility for household h.
Estimation proceeds via a hierarchical Bayesian mixture model, the algorithm for which is de-
scribed in section 6 below, by assuming that the ε’s are distributed iid type I extreme value and
that the vector of ξh jk’s are distributed multivariate normal with variance-covariance matrix Σk.
Note that, given the resulting logit choice probabilities, the γ value for one of the products must
be fixed for the model to be identified, and thus there are J− 1 elements in the γh vector for each
household/occasion type. Therefore, xh jβk actually yields the difference in mean utility between
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the given product and the first (fixed) product. The values for the γh vectors are drawn using the
purchase choices of individual households, while identification of the βk vectors and the Σk matrices
is achieved using the observed values of the γh vectors across all households with a positive number
of choices from the corresponding occasion type k.
As previously mentioned, the vector of probabilities for assignment into the consumption occa-
sion types is the same across demographically similar households2, and this vector is denoted pvecτ
for each household type τ . These probabilities are identified across households of the same type
that differ in their values of γhk. Estimation of this vector is important in this analysis, as it these
probabilities that will allow marketers to identify the segments that are “important” to a specific
demographic.
The intuition behind the above structure is as follows. While a household’s preferences for a spe-
cific consumption occasion type are fixed, these preferences are a function of many variables, some
of which are unobservable. To model the unobserved portion of occasion type/household choices,
the iid “error” is added to preferences, as in any discrete choice model. Given the coefficients on
utility of individual households over the occasion types, these coefficients (within an occasion type)
will be related across households. For example, households purchasing for a “healthy breakfast”
will tend to have similar preferences over characteristics of ready-to-eat cereals. These preferences
will differ slightly3 due to heterogeneity in individual tastes, and thus the second vector of errors
is added to reflect a distribution of tastes within each occasion type. This distribution is assumed
to be multivariate normal, as it makes sense that differences in tastes for one product over another
will be correlated across households. Note that estimation of these distributions of household coef-
ficients over an occasion type will provide useful information about the relative importance of var-
ious product characteristics within the occasion type, how the coefficients “move” together across
households, the relationship of products purchased for the given occasion, and could be used for
counterfactual analysis and/or new product introductions. It is also important to note that I make no
attempt to identify the actual context of these occasion types, that is, I do not attempt to determine
whether the occasion is “healthy breakfast” or “late-afternoon cereal snack.” However, given that
2For the sake of practical application to identify the preferences of demographic segments, the set of household types
are assumed to be pre-specified by the marketer. The model could be extended to make the pvec vector draws a function
of household demographics.
3I use “slightly” to describe these differences, as it is expected that the differences within an occasion type will differ,
but to a lesser degree than the preferences across occasion types.
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the probabilities of each household belonging to a specific occasion type will also be identified by
the model, the occasion types with the largest probabilities (within a targeted demographic) can be
further analyzed to discover the structure of the the market for that occasion type4. Thus the market
structure for “important” occasion types can be analyzed without specifically labeling the occasions.
IV.3 The Simulated Data
To demonstrate the general convergence properties of the model, I simulate a household-level
panel dataset and estimate the known value of the given parameters. I simulate 5 brands/products in
a category in which there are frequent purchases and significant variety-seeking within individual
household purchases, even within occasion types. The simulate product data uses brand intercepts
together with two characteristics for each product. Therefore, the design matrix for each product
consists of 4 dummy variables and two generated characteristics. The first generated characteristic
is assumed to be price, and is simulated accordingly to reflect similarity across households. This was
done by randomly drawing a vector of mean prices from a uniform distribution and using these mean
prices to create random draws of prices for each product. To realistically reflect price differences
across markets, each household is assigned a “price inflator” of 1, 1.1, 1.2, or 1.3, which is used (via
multiplication) to change the mean price vector for that household across all choice occasions. The
mean and standard deviation of prices across households for each product are shown in table IV.1.
The second characteristic is simply a vector of standard uniform draws, and could be interpreted as
a measure of promotion, advertising in the area, etc. Given the logit form of the choice probabilities,
the design matrix used in the simulation is the matrix of differences between each product and the
first product. That is, if x1 denotes the characteristics of the first product, the characteristics used in
the simulation are given by xdj = x j− x1 for all j 6= 1.
The household data is simulated using the data generating mechanism described in the previous
section, wherein:
i) Some number of purchase choices are observed for each household.
ii) The choices of each household are randomly distributed across a finite number of consumption
4 It should be noted that given the preferences over the products within an occasion type, it may be possible for a
practitioner to draw some conclusions about the context of each occasion type.
89
Table IV.1: Mean and variance of simulated
prices.
Table IV.2: Values of the β vectors used to
simulate the data.
Table IV.3: Values of the Σ matrices (and corresponding correlation matrices) used to simulate the
data.
occasion types according to a fixed probability vector for each household type.
iii) The choice probabilities for each household at each consumption occasion type are calculated
using a random draw from the fixed distribution of preferences (across households) for each
consumption occasion type.
iv) The choice for each consumption occasion is randomly assigned using the resulting choice
probabilities of the corresponding occasion from step iii) above.
To proceed with the simulation, the number of households and the number of choices are both
fixed at 300, representative of a long household panel of a relatively frequently purchased product.
Two occasion types are used in the simulation of the choices, and the vector of probabilities of
assignment to each consumption occasion type for each household type is calculated from normal-
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Table IV.4: Simulated purchase quantities of 4 randomly selected households.
ized vectors of 2 random standard uniform draws. The values of the β vectors for each occasion
type are randomly drawn as iid vectors of Uniform(-2,2) draws, and are shown in table IV.2. The
values for the Σ matrices are random draws from an inverted Wishart distribution with parameters
ν = 8 and V = 2∗ I6, the values of which (together with the corresponding correlation matrices) are
shown in table IV.3, yielding a decent amount of correlation in the heterogeneity of tastes across
households within the same occasion type. The γ vectors for each consumption occasion type for
each household are simulated by multiplying a vector of iid standard normal draws by the transpose
of the Cholesky root of the inverse of the corresponding Σ matrix and adding the corresponding β
vector5. Using the drawn probability of assignment for each household, the household choice occa-
sions are randomly assigned over the two segments using random binomial draws. Using the choice
probabilities resulting from the draws of the γ vectors, the choices for each consumption occasion
are random draws from a multinomial distribution. The cumulative choices for each consumption
occasion type for 4 randomly selected households are presented in table IV.4, demonstrating the
presence of significant heterogeneity across households even within a given consumption occasion
type.
5 This is a common way to draw from a multivariate normal with mean β and variance-covariance matrix Σ.
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IV.4 Demonstration of the Problem
To demonstrate the seriousness of ignoring within-household heterogeneity, I analyze the sim-
ulated dataset described above using a simplified logit choice model. Suppose that a practitioner
chooses to model the simulated data with the (single) choice utility for each household defined by
uh j = xdjβ + εh j
where β is similar across all households and ε is distributed iid type I extreme value.Given this
structure, if yt denotes a single choice and yt j = 1 indicates that product j is chosen, then the choice
probabilities of household h are given by
Pr(y jt = 1|Xdh ,β ) =
exp(xdh jβ )
1+∑Ni=2 exp(xdhiβ )
,
where the 1 in the denominator represents the choice utility of product 1 begin fixed at 0 for identifi-
cation of the model, and Xdh is the matrix composed of the differenced vectors of product character-
istics. Note that each choice probability is essentially (via the modeling assumption) the population
proportion of choice occasions over the “infinite” population of choice occasions in which which
household h chooses product j. Taking the natural log of this expression yields
log(Pr(y j|Xdh ,β ))
log(Pr(y1|Xdh ,β ))
= xh jβ .
Therefore, given the large number of choice occasions over the relatively small number of products
so that the observed shares of each product for each household are positive, the ratio of observed
shares can be calculated as above and the logit model reduces to regressing the ratio of log observed
shares on the observed (differenced) data.
Running this regression yields the results presented in table IV.5, wherein the regression could
be taken as having a reasonably believable result given an R-squared of nearly 60% and the flat/bal-
anced plot of the residuals versus the fitted values in IV.1. Intuitively speaking, modeling the house-
hold with a single set of preferences would seem to estimate the single β vector as an “average”
of the true β vectors, and in the case of the (differenced) brand intercept for product 4 (β3), this is
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Table IV.5: Results of the logit regression on simulated purchase shares.
Figure IV.1: Residual plot for the logit regression on observed purchase shares.
true. The estimated value of β3 is essentially zero, which is roughly half-way between the values
of the two true occasion type means in table IV.2. Though an average can often be quite useful,
this estimate could yield very poor results if used in the calculation of elasticities for counterfactual
analysis on pricing or promotion. To see this, note that the true values of the coefficients imply that
most households either significantly prefer product 3 to product 1 or significantly prefer product 1
to product 3, and thus changes in the price or promotions of either product will not induce as great a
change in the observed shares as the estimated coefficients would indicate. Even more concerning is
the unmodeled correlation that, if picked up by the single estimated β vector, can result in different
values than one might expect. For example, the price coefficients (β5) in the simulated data are
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-1.32 and -1.44, respectively, while the estimated coefficient in the simplified logit analysis is -1.16,
far from an “average” of the two modes of the occasion types. Therefore, even if a marketer desires
only an “average” effect over the true β vectors of household purchases, ignoring within-household
heterogeneity for the sake of computational simplicity could yield very misleading estimates. My
model is specifically designed to be applied by practitioners to avoid such problems.
IV.5 MCMC Algorithm
Given the structure presented in section 2, the Markov chain Monte Carlo estimation algorithm
proceeds as follows:
1. Choose the parameters of the prior distributions for the Σk matrices and the βk vectors. The
Σk matrices are assumed to be drawn from an inverted Wishart distribution with parameters ν
and V0, and the βk vectors are assumed to be normally distributed with mean β and variance
A−1.
2. Pick arbitrary starting values of γhk for each of the k segments for each household h.
3. Begin estimation at the household level, h (this step allows parallelization across households).
i) Data Augmentation step: Assign each cereal choice, yt , purchased by household h of de-
mographic type τ to a given occasion type according to the vector of probabilities pvecτ ,
augmented by the probability that the choice yt maximizes the utility of the household
given the current value of γhk for each occasion type. That is, if pikhi denotes the proba-
bility that the choice yt of household h with demographic type τ is assigned to occasion
type k, and pvecτk denotes the element of pvecτ that corresponds to occasion type k, and
Pr(yt |γhk) denotes the probability that choice yt would result from the vector of utilities
γhk, then:
pikhi =
pvecτk Pr(yt |γhk)
1+∑Ki=2 pvecτi Pr(yt |γhi)
where, given that the ε’s are distributed type I extreme value, the choice probabilities
Pr(yt |γh·) are of the logit form. Thus, if yt j = 1 corresponds to choosing product j at
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choice occasion t,
Pr(yt j = 1|γhk) = exp(γhk j)1+∑Ji=2 exp(γhki)
where γhk1 is fixed at 0 for all households. Note that due to the simplicity of these cal-
culations, they are computationally inexpensive and allow the chain to move relatively
quickly over each choice of the household.
ii) Given the choices assigned to each of the k occasion types of household h, draw a new
value of γhk using a Metropolis Hastings Gaussian random-walk. To implement this
step, a new γhk is drawn and is either accepted or rejected. Dropping the subscripts,
define γold as the current value of γhk, and draw a new value via
γnew = γold + ε where ε ∼ N(0,s2I)
with s defined as the step size of the chain. Denoting the set of observed choices of
household h assigned to occasion type k as Yk, the random walk proceeds by calculating
α = min
{
1,
Pr(Yk|γnew)p(γnew|βk,Σk)
Pr(Yk|γold)p(γold |βk,Σk)
}
where Pr(Yk|γ·) can be easily calculated given the previously stated logit probabilities
using the multinomial distribution,and p(γ·|βk,Σk) is simply the density of the multi-
variate normal distribution with parameters βk and Σk evaluated at γ· . Given that these
are common distributions, most software programs have prewritten functions to calcu-
late these values6. Once α is calculated, the new value of γhk is accepted with probability
α , and rejected (i.e. leaving the current value in place) with probability (1−α). Note
that the choice of step size, s, is important to how a Metropolis Hastings random-walk
functions and must be chosen in such a way as to allow the chain to navigate the space
without accepting new values too frequently7.
6 The simulations in this paper are run using the R software package, with the function dmultinom being used to
calculate the probability of Yk and lndMvn (from the bayesm package) being used to evaluate the multivariate normal
density at γ·
7 The simulations in this paper dynamically adjust the step size s over the first several thousand iterations to achieve
acceptance rates around .23, the value suggested by Rossi and Allenby (2003).
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4. After drawing the choice assignments and γ vectors for each household, the value of pvecτ
is updated for each household demographic type. This is accomplished via a draw from a
Dirichlet distribution with parameters (ak + nk) where ak is the initial value of the Dirichlet
parameters and nk is the number of choices assigned to occasion type k at the current draw. A
draw from the corresponding Dirichlet distribution is taken for each household demographic
type, which allows the probabilities to differ substantially between household types.
5. Begin estimation at the aggregate, occasion-type, level k (this step allows parallelization
across occasion types).
i) Assuming that the ξh jk’s are distributed multivariate normal with covariance matrix Σk,
use the given values of γhk for the households assigned to occasion type k to draw new
values for the βk’s and Σk’s using the seemingly-unrelated-regression (henceforth SUR)
sampler proposed by McCulloch, Polson, and Rossi (2000) for the multinomial probit
model. This is implemented by first drawing βk given the current value of Σk and the
observed matrix of γhk vectors, using
βk ∼ N(β˜ ,V˜ ),
with
V˜ = (X ′stXst +A)
−1 , β˜ = V˜ (X ′stγst +Aβ )
where Xst is the stacked matrix of the product characteristics for each household and γst
is the vector composed of the stacked γhk vectors of the household, with both multiplied
by the transpose of the Cholesky root of the inverse of Σk. The draw of β is then
completed by the common procedure of multiplying a vector of standard normal draws
by the Cholesky root of V˜ and adding β˜ .
ii) The draw of Σk is then completed using an inverted Wishart distribution with param-
eters (ν + n) and (V0 + S)−1, where n is the number of households with a positive
number of choices assigned to occasion type k, and S is the matrix composed of the
sum of the crossproduct of the row of the residual vectors for each household (S =
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∑ni=1(γhk −Xhβk)(γhk −Xhβk)′ ). Most popular software programs can provide draws
from an inverted Wishart distribution once these parameters are calculated.
6. Repeat steps 2-4 for a sufficient number of draws for the Markov chain to burn-in and con-
verge.
IV.6 Applying the Model to Data
IV.6.1 Application to Simulated Data
The model was applied to the simulated data using the typical “flat” prior distribution parameters
of β = 0, A = .1 ∗ I6, and ν = 8, with the exception being the prior parameter V0. This parameter
for the inverted Wishart distribution is typically chosen to be ν ∗ I6 in the SUR regression for the
multinomial probit. However, for the purposes of the model presented here, V0 was set to I6. The
reason for this change is in the modeling assumption that preferences within an occasion type are
somewhat similar across households. Larger values for V0 allow the values on the diagonal of
the draws of the Σ matrices (and the subsequent deviations from mean utility across households)
to become very large relative to the fixed size of the within-household type I extreme value errors,
removing the necessity of similarity across households required by the model (a problem not present
in the multinomial probit model). Therefore, the prior was set to a smaller value that still provides
ample freedom for the sampler to navigate the space, and is still “diffuse” relative to the expected
size of the ξ error terms. The algorithm was run for 100,000 draws using a thinning parameter of
100 and a burn-in of 15,000 draws.
A summary of the posterior draws of the elements of the β vectors and Σ matrices are presented
in tables IV.6 and IV.7, respectively, together with the upper and lower bounds for 95% Bayesian
credible intervals and the corresponding true values. The algorithm does very well in navigating to
the true values for both occasion types with all of the 95% intervals of the elements of the β vectors
including their corresponding true values, and all but one of the 95% intervals of the elements of the
Σ matrices including their corresponding true values (the single element of the Σ matrix of occasion
type 2 that is not included in the interval is still within the range of the post-burn-in draw sequence).
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The trace plots for all of these draw sequences are presented in the appendix for the interested reader.
Table IV.6: Summary of the posterior draws for the elements of the β vectors of each occasion type,
together with the true values of each element (an “*” indicates that the true value falls within the
given 95% Bayesian credible interval).
Table IV.7: Summary of the posterior draws for the elements of the Σ matrix of each occasion type,
together with the true values of each element (an “*” indicates that the true value falls within the
given 95% Bayesian credible interval).
A summary of the posterior draws of the values of pvec for the 4 aforementioned randomly
selected households are presented in table IV.8, together with the bounds of the corresponding 95%
Bayesian credible intervals and the corresponding true values. Though more diffuse than the draws
of parameters estimated over all households (as expected), the model also does well in picking up
these values, with the exception being the draws for simulated household number 80 for which the
95% credible intervals do not include the true values (though the true values are within the range of
98
the post-burn-in draw sequence). Note that, coincidentally, simulated household number 80 is one
of only 3 households of the 300 simulated households in which the credible intervals for the draws
of the elements of pvec do not include the true values.
Table IV.8: Summary of the posterior draws for the elements of pvec for four randomly selected
households, together with the true values of each element (an “*” indicates that the true value falls
within the given 95% Bayesian credible interval).
Given the structure of the model, one may think that the algorithm would have difficulty iden-
tifying the parameters in datasets for which there are strong differences in preferences between
occasion types (i.e. large differences in the values of the β vectors). The intuition behind this being
that the β vectors could “soak up” the variation in purchases, leaving very little heterogeneity for
identification of the Σ matrices. To investigate this, the results of another simulation, run on three
occasion types, are presented in tables IV.10, IV.11, and IV.12 in the appendix. The β vectors used in
this simulation are presented in table IV.9, and are clearly representative of very strong preferences
for different products across the 3 occasion types.
As shown in the appendix, the results of 100,000 draws with a burn-in of 15,000 draws are still
very good. All of the 95% credible intervals of the elements of the β vectors of the three occasion
types include their corresponding true values, and while the Σ results are slightly weaker given the
strong effects from the β vectors, the sampler still consistently navigates to the true values. All but 6
of the 95% credible intervals of the elements of the Σ matrices for the 3 occasion types include their
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Table IV.9: Values of the β vectors used to simulate the 3 occasion type data.
corresponding true values, with all 30 of the true values being within the range of the post burn-
in draw sequences. Finally, the pvec draws for the 4 randomly selected households are also quite
good, with all intervals for these elements including their corresponding true values. Moreover, only
1 element of the pvec vector for two household types (out of the 90 total simulated elements across
all household types) is outside of the corresponding credible interval, indicating that the model
again does an impressive job of picking up the underlying true values. If, however, a practitioner
is concerned that the model may not pick up the small covariance parameters of the distributions
across occasion types, the model can easily be changed to include only a single Σ distribution across
all occasion types, with the assumption being that correlation in household’s tastes across products
are relatively similar across occasions (a strong, but not unrealistic assumption).
IV.6.2 Application to a Household Panel
As shown above, the model will perform quite well on a variety of household panel datasets in
which the practitioner believes the data-generating process to be in line with the assumptions laid out
in section 2. The remaining issue is choosing the number of segments with which to model the given
data. For this purpose, computation of the model likelihood can be used for comparison of models
with a different number of specified occasion types. Though more complex than a basic LCM or
finite mixture model, the logit choice probabilities do allow direct calculation of the conditional
likelihood of the observed data given the value of the parameters. The first step to calculate the
conditional likelihood is to calculate the vector of probabilities that a single consumption occasion
for a given household results in the selection of each product. Given the design matrix Xdh , the values
of the γhk vectors for household h ( henceforth denoted γh) , and the value of pvec for household h,
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the probability that product j is chosen at choice occasion t is then
Pr(yt j = 1|Xdh ,γh, pvec) =
K
∏
i=1
Pr(yt j = 1|k = i,Xdh ,γhi)Pr(k = i|pvec).
Once these probabilities have been calculated (using the previously provided formula for logit
choice), the distribution of the observed purchase quantities for household h, conditional on γh
and pvec, is multinomial (via the modeling assumption that each unit results from an independent
choice). Therefore, the probability of the observed choice data for household h conditional on γh
and pvec, denoted Pr(datah|Xdh ,γh, pvec), can be easily calculated for each household using built-in
functions for multinomial probabilities. As this probability is conditional on parameter values, the
conditional likelihood of these parameter values are also included in the full conditional likelihood
calculation for each household. After calculating p(γhk|βk,Σk) for each occasion type k (via the
evaluation of a multivariate normal density discussed in section 4), the conditional likelihood of the
observed data for each household h given the parameter values can easily be calculated as
`(datah|Xdh ,γh,β h,Σh, pvec) = Pr(datah|Xdh ,γh, pvec)
K
∏
i=1
p(γhi|βi,Σi)
where β h = {β1,β2, ...,βK} and Σh = {Σ1,Σ2, ...,ΣK}. Given this likelihood for each household, the
(log) conditional likelihood for the observed choice data given the parameter values is then
`(Data|Xdh ,γh,β h,Σh, pvec) =
H
∑
i=1
log(`(datah|Xdh ,γh,β h,Σh, pvec)).
Despite the nested calculations, this likelihood is fairly inexpensive computationally as almost all of
the above calculations are required at some point during the sampling process of each iteration. To
compare two given models (with different numbers of segments), a practitioner may either compare
the sequences of log likelihoods given above (stored at each iteration) as a gauge of the fit of each
model, or use the method of Newton and Raftery (1994) to calculate the log marginal density for
each model (a built-in function which is included in R and other popular software programs) as a
comparison of fit.
Another issue that should be addressed is the possibility of “label switching” over the occasion
types. Given that each occasion type of the model has the same prior, it is possible (as in all
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mixture models) that the occasion types could switch “labels.” That is, two (or more) occasion
types switch the preferences with which they are identified and continue in the draw sequence.
This can typically be identified via the trace plots of the posterior draws, as the parameter values
of two or more occasions will appear to “switch places” through the sequence of draws. Though
label switching is not of great concern in my model due to the mitigating effects of Metropolis
Hastings (preventing large changes in the γ values of each occasion type between iterations) and
the connection of households through pvec (preventing large changes in pvec between iterations8),
there are methods for handling label switching that I will discuss for the sake of being thorough in
my presentation of a mixture-driven model.
There are two popular ways to handle the label switching problem: post-processing the draws
and constraining the segments. As mentioned above, the iteration at which a switch of label occurs
can be (roughly) identified via the posterior draw sequence. Post-processing consists of marking
these events in the chain and relabeling the segments according to the “new” labels. Though the-
oretically simple, post processing can be quite challenging in practice as developing a strategy for
deciding exactly when a label switch has occurred is not a trivial exercise. The latter option, con-
straining the segments, prevents label switching from occurring in the first place and avoids the
challenges of the post-processing method. In this latter method, some of the parameters are con-
strained across segments, preventing the draws of these parameters from switching between those
segments. While this may seem to defeat the purpose of the mixture model, these constraints need
not be heavy handed. For example, if one is attempting to model health-related segments of a
category, a simple ordering constraint over the value of the coefficient on fat content (across the
segments of the model) may alleviate any observed label switching in a model without constraints.
Moreover, it is typical that practitioners will have some information about the category they seek to
analyze, and parameter constraints can be an effective way of incorporating this information into the
model. Implementation can be as simple as redrawing parameters that do not meet the constraints,
making such constraints a quick and easy way to handle label switching when it does occur.
8 The Gibbs sampler typically used in Bayesian mixture models can allow large changes between iterations, leading
to label switching in the draw sequence. My model uses a hybrid sampler, including both Gibbs and Metropolis Hastings
steps, and (together with the modeling assumptions) is much less likely to struggle with label switching.
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IV.7 Conclusion
The goal of this paper was to develop a method, applicable to large household panel datasets, for
investigating preferences over products in a category in such a way as to allow household purchases
to be the result of multiple sets of preferences while also allowing for recovery of household-level
information useful for targeted marketing. The presented hierarchical Bayesian finite mixture model
is both logically and computational attractive, allows for application to large complex datasets such
as ready-to-eat cereal and soft drinks, and allows for useful household-level information about pref-
erences over different types of purchases to be recovered where other (previously presented) models
do not. Results applying the model to multiple simulated datasets demonstrates the ability of the
Markov chain Monte Carlo algorithm to pick up the true underlying parameters, yielding a model
that is both logically and computationally attractive for estimating the components of household
demand.
IV.8 Appendix
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Table IV.10: Summary of the posterior draws for the elements of the β vectors of each occasion
type in the 3 occasion type dataset, together with the true values of each element (an ”*” indicates
that the true value falls within the given 95% Bayesian credibility interval).
Table IV.11: Summary of the posterior draws for the elements of the Σ matrix of each occasion type
in the 3 occasion type dataset, together with the true values of each element (an ”*” indicates that
the true value falls within the given 95% Bayesian credibility interval).
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Table IV.12: Summary of the posterior draws for the elements of pvec for four randomly selected
households in the 3 occasion type dataset, together with the true values of each element (an ”*”
indicates that the true value falls within the given 95% Bayesian credibility interval).
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Table IV.13: Trace plots for the posterior draws of the elements of the β vector for both occasion
types (type 1 on the left).
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Table IV.14: Trace plots of the posterior draws of each element of the Σ matrix for occasion type 1.
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Table IV.15: Trace plots of the posterior draws of each element of the Σ matrix for occasion type 2.
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